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INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2005, a bill entitled the Alien Tort Statute Reform
Act was introduced in the Senate, proposing to amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 in order to, among other things, "clarify jurisdiction of Federal
Courts over a tort action brought by an alien."I To those who have
tangled with this section of the U.S. Code over roughly the past three
decades, the proposal of such legislation to amend it likely comes as
no surprise: the proper interpretation of § 1350 and the provisions
contained therein has generated much debate among courts and legal
scholars alike. Section 1350, commonly known as the Alien Tort Stat-
ute (ATS), 2 was originally enacted in 1789 and guarantees, in its cur-
rent language, that " [t] he district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 3 An-
other provision under § 1350, the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 (TVPA),4 is related to the ATS and is over two hundred years its
junior. Codified as a note to the ATS, the TVPA provides a federal
cause of action to aliens and U.S. citizens for certain claims of torture
and extrajudicial killing. Namely, it states that
[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an indi-
vidual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages
S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005). Once introduced, this bill was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary; at the time of this writing, no further action has been
taken on the bill.
2 Courts and legal scholars have also referred to the ATS as the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) and the Alien Tort Act (ATA). For the sake of clarity, this Comment will
refer to this provision as the ATS throughout, altering quoted text accordingly to
maintain consistency.
Alien's Action for Tort (Alien Tort Statute), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
4 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2000)).
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to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a
claimant in an action for wrongful death.
In addition to creating this explicit basis of liability, the TVPA sets
out terms and requirements that further define the cause of action it
provides. For instance, the TVPA includes detailed definitions for
"torture" and "extrajudicial killing,, 6 and also establishes a statute of
78limitations7 and an exhaustion of remedies requirement-all of
which apply to any claim brought under the TVPA.
In terms of form, then, the ATS and the TVPA are an exercise in
contrasts. The ATS, enacted at the outset of this nation's history,
speaks in terse, open-ended, and somewhat cryptic language, offering
little to define its terms, scope, or even nature. For instance, on its
face, the ATS does not make clear whether it provides only a grant of
federal jurisdiction for certain claims or also creates an implicit cause
of action for those claims. Nor does it indicate what exactly is meant
by the "law of nations" or what constitutes a "tort... in violation" of it.
The TVPA, on the other hand, is a more recent and detailed expres-
sion of legislative will, and provides significantly more guidance to
those seeking to interpret and apply it. The TVPA creates an explicit
cause of action for a narrow set of conduct, precisely defines that con-
duct, and details the manner in which that cause of action must be
pursued. In short, it lacks the fundamental ambiguity that character-
izes the ATS.
For all its clarity and detail, however, the TVPA is silent on at least
one significant point: How exactly should it be understood to interact
with the ATS? More particularly, to what extent should the TVPA be
considered to inform or limit the causes of action that the ATS may
support? Though the two statutes are codified in the same section of
the U.S. Code, neither offers any clear indication as to how it is sup-
posed to fit with the other. The nature of this relationship has
emerged as one of many uncertainties that federal courts have had to
address regarding the proper interpretation of § 1350, largely without
assistance from Congress or the Supreme Court. This Comment at-
tempts to identify the contours of this uncertainty, and suggests, based
on the little guidance that Congress and the Supreme Court have
5 TVPA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
6 Id. § 3.
7 Id. § 2(c).
8 Id. § 2(b).
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given, the appropriate manner in which federal courts should con-
strue this statutory relationship.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of the ATS/TVPA
relationship and outlines the prevailing precedent that has emerged
in the federal courts regarding how the two statutes should be under-
stood to interact. Courts generally have held that the TVPA should be
read as supplemental to, rather than preclusive of, the ATS, and thus
that the ATS and the TVPA are both able to support their own distinct
yet potentially overlapping causes of action for alien plaintiffs' claims
of official torture and extrajudicial killing.9 That said, courts have not
treated these statutes as fully independent of one another, but rather
have often imported some (but not all) of the terms and requirements
from the more detailed TVPA into their ATS analyses.'°
In Enahoro v. Abubakar, however, the Seventh Circuit rejected this
prevailing supplemental interpretation of the ATS/TVPA relation-
ship, and held instead that the TVPA should be read to "occupy the
field" of the ATS with respect to claims of official torture and extraju-
dicial killing.1' Under this preclusive interpretation, alien plaintiffs
seeking to bring such claims must do so under the TVPA, not the
ATS, and thus must comply with all of the TVPA's terms and require-
ments. Discussion of this decision and the arguments on its behalf
constitutes Part II of this Comment.
Part III then argues that the Seventh Circuit's preclusive interpre-
tation, though it has its appeal, nonetheless produces an inappropri-
ate result for courts to follow. Instead, a supplemental understanding
of the two statutes corresponds most closely with the limited guidance
that Congress and the Supreme Court have offered on the matter,"
and creates an interaction between the statutes that allows both to re-
tain a meaning and value in the statutory scheme that most accurately
reflect their respective language and purposes.13
This rejection of the Seventh Circuit's preclusive interpretation,
however, does not necessarily amount to a wholesale endorsement of
the prevailing precedent in other circuits. Building off of Part III's
analysis, Part IV examines how a supplemental understanding of the
ATS/TVPA relationship can be applied most properly to the details of
9 See infra Part ID, I.F.
10 See infra Part I.F.
1 408 F.3d 877, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
12 See infta Part 1IIA-B.
13 See infra Part III.C.
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the interactions between the statutes and, in so doing, suggests how
the prevailing precedent may be modified so as to respect more com-
pletely this supplemental understanding.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATS/TVPA RELATIONSHIP
A. The "Legal Lohengrin ". Early History of the A TS
The ATS was initially enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,14
and its language has survived with relatively few modifications for over
two hundred years.' 5 Beyond that, not much can be said definitively
about the origins of this statute or the intentions underlying its en-
actment. As the Supreme Court noted in its recent treatment of the
ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute suffers from a "poverty of
drafting history," which has prevented "a consensus understanding of
what Congress intended" from forming, "despite considerable schol-
arly attention."' 16 Moreover, the ATS was seldom invoked and applied
in the courts for nearly two centuries following its enactment, further
frustrating any efforts to pin down the original contours and inten-
tions of this statute. 7 Such ambiguous origins led Judge Friendly to
aptly describe the ATS as a "legal Lohengrin;... no one seems to
know whence it came." 18
What little information courts and legal scholars have been able to
glean regarding the early life of the ATS has yielded much speculation
but limited cohesive insight. As one commentator has noted, "Some
scholars speculate that the framers of the statute designed the legisla-
:4 Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 67, 77 (1789).
5 The original language of the statute read, "[T]he district courts... shall also
have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts,
as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
16 542 U.S. 692, 718-19 (2004); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1091
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting the "complete silence in the [ATS]'s legislative history" and
compiling previous cases that have found the same), withdrawn and superseded in part on
reh'g, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'gen bancgranted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Beth Stephens, Translating Filrtiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALEJ. INT'L L.
1, 7 (2002) ("For about two hundred years [after its enactment], the [ATS] was largely
ignored, rarely cited, and relied upon in only two cases."); Genc Trnavci, The Meaning
and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International
Law, 26 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 193, 195 (2005) ("Subsequent to its adoption... , the
[ATS] lay almost completely dormant... and was almost forgotten until the late
1970s.").
18 IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
2008] 1387
1388 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 156:1383
tion in order to avoid conflicts with other nations over mistreatment
of non-U.S. citizens," thus characterizing the ATS as an effort "to pro-
vide national security at a time when the United States, a newly
formed nation, was seeking a foothold in its diplomatic relations with
other nations. ' ' 9 Other scholars have explained the original intent of
the ATS more narrowly, "limit[ing] the purpose of its enactment to
providing the legal foundation to protect the rights of foreign ambas-
sadors"2 0 or "to provid[ing] jurisdiction only in maritime cases dealing
with prizes."' 2' Though none of these particular perspectives has
proven to be more authoritative than the others per se,22 they all, at
the least, support the generalized conclusion that the ATS, through its
plain language and historical context, was enacted to ensure some
form of previously unavailable civil remedy to aliens in U.S. federal
23
courts for certain violations of the law of nations. Beyond this level
of generality, the ATS-with its terse language, scant legislative his-
tory, and rare invocation in the courts prior to the second half of the
twentieth century-hides its original intentions well.
B. Rejuvenation of the ATS: Filartiga and Its Progeny
After nearly two hundred years of obscurity and general disuse,
the ATS experienced a rejuvenation of relevance at the end of the
twentieth century. 24 This can be attributed in large part to the emer-
19 Trnavci, supra note 17, at 224.
20 Id. at 225.
21 Id. at 229. For another account of the various theories that have been advanced
regarding the original intent of the ATS, see LucienJ. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The
Implications of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 398-400 (2006).
22 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242-43 (2d Cir. 2003)
(summarizing and acknowledging the various scholarly perspectives that have emerged
regarding the origins of the ATS).
23 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-19 (2004) (surveying various
theories and sources regarding the origin and intent of the ATS, and concluding that
it was enacted to have an immediate "practical effect" rather than "to be placed on the
shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize
the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law of na-
tions actionable for the benefit of foreigners"); Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of
Decision for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 462 (2007)
("The statute as written in 1789 appears to have been intended to provide a forum and
a possible remedy for international legal wrongs that otherwise would be unredress-
able....").
24 See Trnavci, supra note 17, at 196 ("Since the 1960s, [ATS] cases have become
more numerous."); see also id. at 232-46 (summarizing cases brought under the ATS
since 1960).
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gence of a new field of potential application for the statute-
international human rights. "Since 1980, plaintiffs have invoked the
[ATS] in United States federal courts to sue perpetrators of such in-
ternational human rights violations as torture, disappearances, sum-
mary execution, genocide, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity."' 5
Ushering in this era of rejuvenation was the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which a Paraguayan family sought to
use the ATS to sue a former Paraguayan police inspector-general for
torturing and killing a member of their family in Paraguay.26 Revers-
ing the decision of the lower court, the Second Circuit held that the
ATS provided a legitimate source of subject matter jurisdiction for the
claim27 and, in so doing, breathed new life into the statute. 8 In mak-
ing the jurisdictional determination that "deliberate torture perpe-
trated under the color of official authority'' 29 constituted a "tort... in
violation of the law of nations" under the ATS, 30 the Second Circuit
held that the ATS should be read to incorporate "international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the na-
tions of the world today.''3 Applying this standard, the court found
that official torture constituted a violation of "established norms of
the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.
"Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like
the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an en-
emy of all mankind.2 3 Thus, the court determined, "whenever an al-
25 Hugh King, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REv. 1, 2 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Stephens, supra note 17,
at 7 ("Since 1980, a series of decisions has slowly developed the jurisdictional reach of
the [ATS]. Federal courts have assumed jurisdiction over cases between aliens alleging
abuses such as genocide, war crimes, summary execution, disappearance, and arbitrary
detention, as well as torture."); Trnavci, supra note 17, at 246 (noting that U.S. courts,
in applying the ATS, have held that certain "gross violations of human rights" violate
the law of nations).
26 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., King, supra note 25, at 4 ("Filartiga saw the Second Circuit rescue the
[ATS] from almost two hundred years of near-obscurity.").
29 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
30 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
31 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
32 Id. at 880; see also id. at 884 ("Having examined the sources from which custom-
ary international law is derived-the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works
of jurists-we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations."
(footnote omitted)).
33 Id. at 890.
2008] 1389
1390 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 156:1383
leged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction. "s
In acknowledging that official torture, as a tort in violation of the
law of nations, was sufficient to establish federal subject matter juris-
diction under the ATS, the Second Circuit also implicitly recognized
"the existence of a private right of action for aliens only seeking to rem-
edy violations of customary international law or of a treaty of the
United States."'3 ' Holding that "the law of nations... has always been
part of the federal common law," the court deemed it appropriate to
construe the ATS as "opening the federal courts for adjudication of
the rights already recognized by international law."
3 6
In the years following the decision, Filartiga emerged as the stan-
dard-bearer for claims brought under the ATS for human rights viola-
tions such as official torture. Federal courts largely adopted the Sec-
ond Circuit's holdings and reasoning as a general framework for their
own ATS analyses, producing a line of precedent that was generally
consistent but also undeveloped and unpredictable in important re-
spects, such as the definition of the appropriate scope of violations
37covered by the statute.
Even with a general consistency emerging in the courts, however,
there was still ample room for interpretation and disagreement re-
garding the fundamental quality of the ATS. Such uncertainty was
epitomized by the D.C. Circuit's fractured decision in Tel-Oren v. Lib-
yan Arab Republic.38 In Tel-Oren, the three reviewing judges affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claim but were unable
to reach any consensus beyond that in their interpretations of the
ATS, resulting in a per curiam decision supported by three distinct-
and, in some respects, fundamentally conflicting-concurring opin-
34 Id. at 878.
35 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 243 (2d Cir. 2003) (summarizing
Filartiga).
'6 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885, 887.
37 See King, supra note 25, at 5 ("Since Filartiga, United States federal courts have
entertained many actions brought under the [ATS] by aliens alleging international
human rights abuses. The courts, with little judicial dissent, have followed Filartiga in
finding that the [ATS] provides both subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action
for serious violations of international law.... The same level of judicial consensus,
however, has not been reached in respect of the standards to be applied in determin-
ing which torts in violation of international law are actionable under the [ATS]."); see
also id. at 5-10 (summarizing cases and delineating the divergent standards).
38 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 103 (1985).
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ions.39 Of particular relevance here is the debate between Judges Ed-
wards and Bork regarding the nature and scope of the ATS. Judge
Edwards endorsed Filartiga's general formulation of the ATS as "more
faithful to the pertinent statutory language and to existing prece-
dent."40 He noted that, under this formulation, "[t]he Second Circuit
did not require plaintiffs to point to a specific right to sue under the
law of nations in order to establish jurisdiction under [the ATS];
rather, the Second Circuit required only a showing that the defen-
dant's actions violated the substantive law of nations." 41 Once that
showing had been made, the ATS would provide both a forum and a
cause of action.42 Judge Edwards also joined the Second Circuit in its
construction of the "law of nations" under § 1350, interpreting it to
incorporate modern principles of international law.43
Judge Bork, on the other hand, believed that this formulation of
the ATS amounted to an impermissible encroachment by the judiciary
on the powers of the legislative and executive branches, and thus ad-
vocated that "it is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of
action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of in-
ternational law in a federal tribunal."" UnderJudge Bork's interpre-
tation, the ATS would operate strictly as a jurisdictional statute, and
would not, in itself, give rise to a right to sue. Judge Bork did, how-
ever, recognize that the ATS could be read to support a cause of ac-
tion for a very limited number of "torts... in violation of the law of
nations"-namely, those that the parties originally drafting and enact-
ing the ATS likely had in mind. 45 To Judge Bork, then, whatever im-
plicit right to sue there may be in the ATS would not properly include
modern principles of international law.46
39 Id. at 775.
40 Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 777.
42 Id. at 780.
43 Id. at 789.
44 Id. at 801 (BorkJ., concurring).
45 Id. at 815-16. In identifying such torts, Judge Bork focused on those violations
of the law of nations enumerated by Blackstone and given particular attention by the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789-for instance, "piracy" and "infringement
of the rights of ambassadors." Id. at 813-15.
46 Id. at 816-19.
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C. Congressional Response: The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
After roughly a decade of judicial construction (and, as seen in
Tel-Oren, dispute) regarding the proper nature and role of the ATS,
Congress offered some measure of guidance by enacting the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991. 47 Codified as a note appended to the
ATS, the TVPA stands in contrast to the ATS in its length, detail, and
relatively extensive legislative history. According to this history, the
TVPA was designed to "carry out the intent of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate on October 27,
1990... by making sure that torturers and death squads will no
longer have a safe haven in the United States.,,48 As the Senate Judici-
ary Committee noted, Congress, by enacting the TVPA, recognized
the line of precedent stemming from Filartiga, acknowledged the un-
certainty still surrounding the nature of the ATS as seen in Tel-Oren,
and responded by creating "an unambiguous basis for a cause of ac-
tion that has been successfully maintained under [the ATS] .' The
TVPA would provide an alien with a federal cause of action "against
any individual who, under actual or apparent authority or under color
of law of any foreign nation, subjects any individual to torture or ex-
trajudicial killing"-as cases such as Filartiga had already deemed to be
available under the ATS itself-and "would also enhance the remedy
already available under [the ATS] ... [by] extend[ing] a civil remedy
also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad. 50 In addi-
tion to creating this "unambiguous basis," Congress chose to flesh out
the contours of the TVPA's cause of action in some detail-for in-
stance, by explicitly imposing a statute of limitations and an exhaus-
tion of remedies requirement and providing definitions for "torture"
and "extrajudicial killing."5
47 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000).
48 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991), re-
printed in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85-86 (stating that the TVPA satisfied the obligation
under this Convention "to provide means of civil redress to victims of torture").
49 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86 ("The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for
a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under [the ATS] ....").
50 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-5; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86 (recognizing the TVPA's interaction with and enhancement of the
Filartiga line of precedent by creating such a cause of action).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note §§ 2(b)-(c), 3 (2000).
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The legislative history of the TVPA also sheds some limited light
on the manner in which Congress generally intended the ATS and the
TVPA to interact with one another. Although Congress was fully
aware of the potential overlap in coverage between the ATS and the
TVPA, none of the TVPA's legislative history speaks directly or specifi-
cally to it. As a general matter, both the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees made it a point to indicate that the TVPA was not in-
tended to supplant the ATS, but rather that the ATS was to "remain
intact.' ' 52 In apparent affirmance of this general intention, Congress
enacted the TVPA without amending or repealing any of the language
of the ATS itself.
D. Pre-Sosa Interaction Between the A TS and the TVPA
Since enacting the TVPA, Congress has left the ATS intact and has
not passed any further legislation to address it, the TVPA, or the
proper interaction between the two. Furthermore, as discussed in
Part I.E, infra, the Supreme Court did not speak on the ATS or the
TVPA in any substantial manner until its opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,53 which came nearly twenty-five years after Filartiga and over
ten years after the enactment of the TVPA. Given this silence and the
TVPA's apparent endorsement of Filartiga, the years following the
TVPA's enactment saw federal courts continuing to adopt the Filartiga
formulation of the ATS to develop the contours of the statute in its
modern context, 54 and now also using it to inform their understand-
ing of the ATS/TVPA relationship. In construing this relationship,
most courts clung to the few general statements made about it in the
legislative history of the TVPA, and recognized that claims of official
52 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5 ("Section 1350 has other important uses and should
not be replaced.... [C]laims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust
the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by section 1350. Consequently,
that statute should remain intact."). The House Report mirrored this sentiment, but
with slightly different language, stating that "claims based on torture and summary
executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered" under
the ATS, and thus "[t]hat statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other
norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary interna-
tional law." H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86.
53 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
54 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846-47 (11 th Cir. 1996) (outlining
and adopting the Filartiga formulation of the ATS and citing cases, both pre- and post-
TVPA, to support its conclusion that "[s]ince Filartiga, a majority of courts have inter-
preted section 1350 as providing both a private cause of action and a federal forum
where aliens may seek redress for violations of international law").
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torture and extrajudicial killing could be brought under the TVPA,
the ATS, or both.55
Just as it had with Filartiga, the Second Circuit played a prominent
role in developing this line of precedent. In Kadic v. Karadi, the
Second Circuit considered the plaintiffs' claims of official torture and
summary execution under both the ATS and the TVPA simultane-
ously.5 16 In so doing, the court stated its belief that "Congress enacted
the [TVPA] to codify the cause of action recognized by this Circuit in
Fildrtiga" and, after reviewing the legislative history of the TVPA, con-
cluded that "[t] he scope of the [ATS] remains undiminished by enact-
ment of the [TVPA] .,, Thus, in addition to acknowledging the explicit
cause of action granted by the TVPA, the court also deemed it appro-
priate to recognize a cause of action under the ATS independent of the
TVPA, much as it would have prior to the TVPA's enactment. 58 The
Second Circuit's analysis in Kadic set the general tone for other courts'
interpretations of the ATS/TVPA relationship, and in the years leading
up to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, claims for official torture
and extrajudicial killing were often permitted to be brought not just
under the TVPA, but also under the ATS.59 Despite this loose consen-
55 See infta note 59 and accompanying text.
56 70 F.3d 232, 243-46 (2d Cir. 1995). The court also recognized that in certain
limited circumstances the ATS may be able to support claims of torture against private
parties, without regard to official status or state action. Id. at 243-44. The TVPA, due
to its plain language and legislative history, would not be able to support such claims.
Id. at 244-45.
57 Id. at 241.
58 The court, for instance, did not subject the claims for torture and summary
execution under the ATS to an exhaustion of remedies analysis, as the TVPA requires
of its claims. Id. at 243-45.
59 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (noting that "no court that has evaluated [ATS] claims since
the enactment of the TVPA has held that the TVPA in any way preempts [ATS] claims
for torture and extrajudicial killings" and thus holding that the "plaintiffs' claims un-
der [the ATS] are not preempted by the TVPA," but rather, "[i]n the instant case, the
TVPA simply provides an additional basis for assertion of claims for torture and extra-
judicial killing"); see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2002)
(relying on Kadic and recognizing that claims of official torture are actionable under
the ATS without any reference to the TVPA), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), case dismissed per parties' stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164-69 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing separately
claims under the ATS and the TVPA that are based on the same individual human
rights violations); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772-73, 778-79 (9th Cir.
1996) (applying simultaneous and independent analyses to ATS and TVPA claims aris-
ing from the same acts of official torture and extrajudicial killing); Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at
847-48 (interpreting the enactment of the TVPA as a congressional endorsement of
the Filartiga line of precedent and finding that the ATS itself provides a private right of
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sus, however, the proper interaction between the TVPA and the ATS
remained a largely unsettled matter.6°
E. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: The Supreme Court
Speaks (on the A TS, at Least)
As Judge Edwards lamented in Tel-Oren, the rejuvenation of the
ATS in Filartiga and its subsequent development in the federal courts
created "an area of law that crie[d] out for clarification by the Su-
preme Court."6' Nearly twenty-five years after Filartiga, the Supreme
Court obliged-to some extent. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court
held that the plaintiff's particular arbitrary detention claim was not
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under the ATS.62  The
Court's analysis of the plaintiffs claim largely affirmed the general
line of ATS precedent that had developed through Filartiga and its
63progeny, but tailored the scope of the statute's potential coverage.
The Court first determined that the ATS is fundamentally a jurisdic-
tional statute. 64 The Court, however, also recognized that the ATS has
a limited substantive quality, as "the First Congress did not pass the
action for plaintiffs' claims of torture and other abuses); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation
Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 7-9 (D.D.C. 1998) (endorsing Kadic and simultaneously consid-
ering independent ATS and TVPA claims arising from the same acts of torture and ex-
trajudicial killing); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176-94 (D. Mass. 1995) (indi-
cating, in its analysis of various plaintiffs' claims under the ATS and/or the TVPA, that
claims of official torture and summary execution are still actionable under the ATS
even after the passage of the TVPA, that such claims are to be analyzed under either
the ATS or TVPA according to how they were pleaded, and that each statute carries
with it its own method of analyzing such claims).
60 See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming
the Filartiga precedent but noting the generally uncertain nature of the ATS/TVPA
relationship).
61 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
62 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
6: See id. at 731 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some federal
courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga .. "); see also San-
dra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law
in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementay Strategies, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 169,
171 (2005) (noting that "[i]n Sosa, the Supreme Court affirmed the Filartiga line of
cases" and that "[s]ignificantly, the Court cited with approval cases, including Filartiga,
which permitted ATS claims for [certain] violations of international norms"); Tmavci,
supra note 17, at 244 ("[The ruling in Sosa] did not override Filartiga, which considers
human rights violations as a predicate for tort claims under § 1350. But in contrast to
Filartiga, the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa provides a very cautious and limited in-
terpretation of the law of nations in the context of the [ATS].").
rA Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-14.
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ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use
by a future Congress or state legislature":65
[A] Ithough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action, the reasonable inference from the historic materials is that the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.
The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the un-
derstanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time.
66
Based on this understanding of the original intent of the statute,
the Court concluded that the ATS is properly read as supporting, at
the least, a limited set of claims that were sufficiently recognized as
violations of the law of nations at the time of the ATS's enactment.
67
The Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility that the ATS may
provide grounds for other common law causes of action that are based
on more modern violations of international law, provided that these
modern violations are sufficiently equivalent to those "original" viola-
tions of 1789: "federal courts should not recognize private claims un-
der federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than
the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."6 s  The
Court urged a very "restrained conception of the discretion a federal
court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this
kind,"6 cautioning that "the judicial power should be exercised on the
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping,
and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today."7 ° Lastly,
in recognition of the difficulties inherent in the application of such a
65 Id. at 719; see also id. ("There is too much in the historical record to believe that
Con ress would have enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely.").
Id. at 724.
67 The Court indicated that this "modest set" of violations likely included offenses
against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and individual actions arising out of
prize captures and piracy. Id. at 720.
68 Id. at 732; see also id. at 725 ("[C]ourts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms we have recognized.").
69 Id. at 725.
70 Id. at 729.
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standard, the Court called for legislative clarification regarding the ATS
and the field of law that has developed around it in the courts.7
Throughout its fairly extensive treatment of the ATS, the Court
made little mention of the TVPA or its relationship with the ATS. The
Court acknowledged the TVPA as a congressional affirmance of the
Filartiga precedent 72 and as an argument for exercising judicial cau-
tion in recognizing new causes of action under the ATS, 73 but said
nothing explicit regarding the proper interaction between the two
statutes. The Court did note that, while there is no exhaustion of
remedies requirement in the ATS, it "would certainly consider this re-
quirement in an appropriate case."7 4 This comment could be inter-
preted as implicitly addressing the interaction between the ATS and
the TVPA-namely, as suggesting that, because of the potential over-
lap of coverage between the ATS and the TVPA, it would be appropri-
ate to apply the TVPA's exhaustion requirement to claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing that could be brought under the
TVPA but are brought instead under the ATS. Such an interpretation
would be more speculative than authoritative, however, as the Court,
in this brief consideration of an exhaustion requirement for the ATS,
only cited to the TVPA in passing and without any mention of its
proper relationship with the ATS.
75
F. Post-Sosa Interaction Between the A TS and the TVPA
and the Current Prevailing Precedent
Given the Supreme Court's qualified affirmance of the Filartiga line
of precedent and its general silence on the nature of the ATS/TVPA
relationship, many federal courts have continued to handle the interac-
tion between the two statutes after the Sosa decision in much the same
way as they had beforehand. That is, courts generally have interpreted
Sosa (and its silence) as confirming, or at least not refuting, that claims
71 See id. at 731 (noting that the Court "would welcome any congressional guid-
ance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations").
72 See id. (referencing the Filartiga line of precedent and the TVPA in concluding
that Congress "has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of the proper exer-
cise of thejitdicial power [in construing actionable violations under the ATS], but has...
enact[ed] legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail").
73 See id. at 728 (noting that the limited scope of the TVPA and Congress's failure
to codify any other causes of action since the TVPA's enactment support a constrained
interpretation of the reach of the ATS).
74 Id. at 733 n.21.
75 Id.
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of official torture and extrajudicial killing may be brought under both
(or either) the ATS and the TVPA,76 as had been the trend since
Kadic. 7 Some have further suggested, based on the language of Sosa,
that the enactment of the TVPA directly affirms that official torture
and extrajudicial killing are violations of the law of nations actionable
under the ATS. 78
76 See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (allowing plaintiffs
to seek relief under the ATS and/or the TVPA for acts of official torture); Aldana v.
Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating
that, in Sosa, "the Court did not say that the authority granted in the Torture Victim
Protection Act provided the exclusive authority to hear torture claims," and thus hold-
ing that "a plaintiff may bring distinct claims for torture under each statute"); Cabello
v. Fernindez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1156-58 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing claims of offi-
cial torture and extrajudicial killing simultaneously under the ATS and the TVPA); In
re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1279-1301 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (entertaining
plaintiffs' simultaneous claims for official torture and extrajudicial killing under the
ATS and the TVPA and analyzing those claims independently from one another where
appropriate); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 & n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (analyzing plaintiffs' claims for torture and extrajudicial killing under
the ATS alone and rejecting defendants' contention that the TVPA preempts the ATS
torture claims); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899-903 (W.D. Tenn. 2005)
(citing cases to support its conclusion that "courts have.., construed Sosa to permit
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing to go forward under the [ATS]," and analyz-
ing a plaintiffs claim of official torture and extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA
and the ATS); Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24-28 (D.D.C. 2005)
(applying independent analyses to simultaneous ATS and TVPA claims for official tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1182, 1178 n.13 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that claims of official torture and ex-
trajudicial killing brought simultaneously under the ATS and the TVPA are not dupli-
cative and noting that the court "does not believe that the TVPA precludes claims of
torture and extrajudicial killing under the ATS"); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112,
1145 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (looking to both Sosa and pre-Sosa decisions such as Kadic to
support the decision to allow the plaintiff to "assert a claim for extrajudicial killing un-
der both the TVPA and [the ATS]" because, "[a]lthough the TVPA provides a statutory
basis for a claim of extrajudicial killing, the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish
the scope of the [ATS] in any way"). This is not to say, however, that all courts clearly
embrace this understanding in their handling of ATS and TVPA claims. See, e.g., Ruiz
v. Martinez, No. 07-0078, 2007 WL 1857185, at *6, *8 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2007) (evalu-
ating and dismissing plaintiffs claim of official torture under the TVPA even though
plaintiff did not plead under the TVPA, and though not stating that the claim must be
addressed under the TVPA, declining to consider the claim under a simultaneous and
independent ATS analysis).
77 See supra Part I.D.
78 See, e.g., Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (citing Sosa's "clear mandate" characteriza-
tion of the TVPA as support for viewing claims of official torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing as potentially actionable under the ATS); Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (recog-
nizing the plaintiffs' claims of torture and extrajudicial killing under the ATS and
holding that, "[a]s with Plaintiffs' claims for extrajudicial killings,... the existence of
the TVPA is strong evidence that the prohibition against torture is a binding customary
international law norm"); Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (supporting its decision to
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While courts, both before and after Sosa, have recognized that the
ATS and the TVPA each may support its own claims for official torture
or extrajudicial killing, they have not treated the statutes as fully inde-
pendent of one another. Rather, courts frequently have chosen to
import certain elements of the more detailed TVPA into their analyses
of ATS claims, even when those ATS claims would not otherwise be
covered by the TVPA. For instance, both pre- and post-Sosa courts
generally have found it appropriate to apply the TVPA's ten-year stat-
ute of limitations to all causes of action brought under the ATS. 79
Courts have been seemingly less consistent, on the other hand, in ap-
plying the TVPA's definitions for torture and extrajudicial killing to
ATS claims, sometimes adopting the TVPA definitions in their ATS
analyses and other times looking to international sources for guid-
recognize the plaintiffs claim of extrajudicial killing under the ATS by concluding,
through reference to Sosa, that "Congress' enactment of the TVPA, singling out torture
and extrajudicial killing, confirms that extrajudicial killing provides a cause of action
under federal law").
79 See Arce, 434 F.3d at 1261 n.17, 1264 (noting that the ATS and the TVPA share
the same ten-year statute of limitations); Jean v. Dor~lien, 431 F.3d 776, 778 (11th Cir.
2005) ("Under the TVPA and the [ATS], Plaintiffs have ten years from the date the
cause of action arose to bring suit for torture, extrajudicial killing and other torts
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."); Cabello,
402 F.3d at 1153 (finding it "clear" that the TVPA's ten-year statute of limitations can
be extended to the ATS); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002)
(" [T] he statute of limitations applicable to the [ATS] is that provided by the TVPA.");
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that ATS claims
are governed by a ten-year statute of limitations, per the decision in Papa), reh'gen banc
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), case dismissed per parties' stipulation, 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005); Hereros v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien GMBLT & Co., No. 05-1872, 2006
WL 182078, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2006) (holding that courts should continue to ap-
ply the TVPA's statute of limitations to ATS claims after Sosa, just as was done before
Sosa);Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 366 (D.N.J. 2004) (same); Saravia, 348 F. Supp.
2d at 1146 ("Although there is no express limitation period prescribed by the [ATS],
the Ninth Circuit has held the applicable limitations period to be the 10-year period
set out in the TVPA."); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 2002 WL
319887, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (applying the TVPA's statute of limitations to
ATS claims, explaining the reasoning for doing so, and citing cases in support). For
the general reasoning behind the application of the TVPA's statute of limitations re-
quirement to ATS claims, see infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. Not all
courts, however, have conclusively adopted this view. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. 162, 192-93 (D. Mass. 1995) (declining to determine whether the TVPA's stat-
ute of limitations requirement is the proper one to apply to ATS claims); see also
Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical" Look at the
Use of US. Litigation To Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 473, 538
(2002) ("Cases under the [ATS] generally face the same [statute of limitations as
TVPA cases do], although some courts may apply the usually more restrictive limits
that the U.S. forum state imposes on tort actions.").
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ance.s0 Lastly, in contrast to their more welcoming treatment of the
statute of limitations requirement, courts both before and after Sosa
have been reluctant to impose the TVPA's exhaustion of remedies re-
quirement on claims brought under the ATS-whether it be to all
such claims or just to claims for official torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing, and even when the court may already be applying that exhaustion
requirement to claims brought simultaneously under the TVPA."1
Thus, as has tended to be the case with the ATS in general, not
much is clear regarding how exactly the ATS and the TVPA should be
understood to interact with one another. Federal courts have at-
80 See Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1251 (analyzing a claim of torture under the ATS and
looking to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) to "decid[e] what constitutes torture according to
the laws of nations"); Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 899-900, 902 (referencing cases both
before and after Sosa and finding that "[c]ourts analyzing [ATS] torture claims gener-
ally rely on the definition set forth in the [CAT]," and that "[c]ourts rely on [the
TVPA] definition to analyze claims of extrajudicial killing under the [ATS]"); Saravia,
348 F. Supp. 2d at 1148, 1153-54 (acknowledging, in its analysis of simultaneous ATS
and TVPA claims for extrajudicial killing, that the TVPA provides a definition for the
claim whereas the ATS does not, but not going so far as to state that the TVPA defini-
tion should be applied to the ATS claim); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the CAT definition of
torture to an ATS claim).
81 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[I]t would be
inappropriate, given the lack of clear direction from Congress (either in 1789 or... in
1991), and with only an aside in a footnote on the issue from the Supreme Court, now
to superimpose on our circuit's existing [ATS] jurisprudence an exhaustion require-
ment where none has been required before."), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh ',
487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'gen banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007);Jean,
431 F.3d at 781 ("[T]he exhaustion requirement [of the TVPA] does not apply to the
[ATS]."); Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25 (recognizing that Sosa left the door open for
applying an exhaustion requirement to ATS claims in certain cases, but declining to
conclude that such a requirement is necessary or that, even if necessary, the require-
ment would be imported from the TVPA); Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 n.13 (not-
ing that the court "does not believe that ATS claims must now be modeled after the
TVPA to include an administrative exhaustion requirement," since "[n]othing in Sosa
indicates that the Supreme Court worked such a dramatic change to the ATS");
Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52, 1157 (applying the exhaustion requirement to the
TVPA claim for extrajudicial killing but not to the simultaneous ATS one, stating that
"[p]laintiffs asserting claims under the [ATS] are not required to exhaust their reme-
dies in the state in which the alleged violations of customary international law oc-
curred" (citing pre- and post-Sosa cases)); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at * 17-19 (applying
the TVPA's exhaustion requirement to the TVPA claims but making no mention that it
should be applied to the ATS claims as well, even though the ATS claims are subject to
the TVPA's statute of limitations); Jodie Michalski, Comment, The Careless Gatekeeper:
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, and the Expanding Role of US. Courts in Enforcing International
Norms, 15 TUL.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 731, 744 (2007) ("Despite the prevalence of exhaus-
tion in the broader international context, it is not mandated under the [ATS] and
courts have proved unwilling to read such a requirement into the statute.").
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tempted to read both statutes in accordance with the sparse guidance
provided by Congress and the Supreme Court. This has resulted in,
among other things, the acknowledgment of two distinct yet poten-
tially overlapping federal causes of action for aliens seeking to bring
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing. Courts have allowed
the ATS and the TVPA to inform one another in some respects but
not in others, perhaps in an effort to allow each to benefit practically
from the other's existence without unduly diminishing either statute's
proper scope. Not surprisingly, these efforts to strike such a vague,
uneasy balance have produced some muddied doctrinal waters and
arguably undesirable results. The prospect of such results, and the
general lack of clarity regarding the proper interaction between the
two statutes, led the Seventh Circuit to break with the prevailing
precedent and adopt an alternate, more straightforward interpreta-
tion of the ATS/TVPA relationship. In Enahoro v. Abubakar, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the TVPA "occup[ies] the field" of the ATS with
regard to claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing, and thus
precludes aliens from bringing such claims under the ATS. 2 This
Comment now turns to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Enahoro, and
the rationale and consequences of its preclusive interpretation of the
ATS/TVPA relationship.
82 408 F.3d 877, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1175 (2006). It is not
entirely clear, from the language used by the Seventh Circuit in this opinion, what ex-
actly the scope of this occupation is intended to be. The court's opinion could be read
as determining that the TVPA occupies the field of the ATS with respect to all poten-
tial claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, not just those claims alleging official tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing. See id. at 885, 886 (finding that "the implications [of
Sosa] are that the cause of action Congress provided in the [TVPA] is the one which
plaintiffs alleging torture or extrajudicial killing must plead," and that "lilt is hard to
imagine that the Sosa Court would approve of common law claims based on torture
and extrajudicial killing when Congress has specifically provided a cause of action for
those violations and has set out how those claims must proceed"). Since adopting the
broader interpretation of this holding is unnecessary-the Seventh Circuit in Enahoro
was only confronted with allegations of official torture and extrajudicial killing-and
would only weaken the Seventh Circuit's position with respect to my criticism below, I
adopt the narrower interpretation for the purposes of this Comment and assume that
the Seventh Circuit's holding only pertains to claims of official torture and extyajudi-
cial killing.
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II. ENAHORO V. ABUBAKAR AND ARGUMENTS FOR "OCCUPYING THE FIELD"
A. Overview of the Case
In Enahoro v. Abubakar, Nigerian plaintiffs sought to bring suit un-
der the ATS against a Nigerian general and former head of state for
acts of official torture and extrajudicial killing that occurred in Nige-
ria.' 3 The Seventh Circuit's review of this case covered both the appli-
cability of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
the defendant s4 and also the ability of the ATS to independently sus-
tain a cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing in
light of the TVPA.85 With regard to the ATS issue, the plaintiffs
brought their claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing under
the ATS alone, and made no simultaneous claim under the TVPA.
The district court, in line with the prevailing precedent in other cir-
cuits, recognized that the ATS provided a cause of action for the
plaintiffs' claims independent of the one provided under the TVPA;
accordingly, the district court held that the plaintiffs did not need to
bring their claims under the TVPA, nor did they need to satisfy the
TVPA's exhaustion requirement.
86
The Seventh Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, declined to adopt this un-
derstanding of the interaction between the ATS and the TVPA. It re-
jected the notion that the statutes provide "two bases for relief against
torture and extrajudicial killing"-the TVPA and the "independently
existing common law of nations condemning torture and killing"-
that would "simultaneously exist to provide content to the ATS." 87 In-
stead, according to the Seventh Circuit, the TVPA should be read to
"occupy the field" of the ATS with respect to claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing,8 thus precluding the ATS from providing its
own cause of action for such claims. Furthermore, since such claims
must be brought under the TVPA, they must comply with the TVPA's
requirements, such as exhaustion of remedies.' 9 As the plaintiffs did
83 Id. at 879.
84 Id. at 880-83.
8 Id. at 883-86.
86 See Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (N.D. Il1. 2003) ("An alien
plaintiff basing federal jurisdiction on the [ATS] need not also assert a claim under, or
comply with the terms of, the TVPA .... [B]ecause plaintiffs have not alleged a TVPA
claim, the TVPA's exhaustion requirement does not apply.").
87 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 884.
Id. at 884-85.
89 Id. at 886.
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not bring their claim under the TVPA, the court remanded the case for
determination of "whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend
their complaint to state such a claim and, if they do, whether, in fact,
the exhaustion requirement in the [TVPA] defeats their claim."9°
B. Occupation: Rationale and Consequences
The Seventh Circuit found support for its "occupying the field" in-
terpretation both in the legislative history of the TVPA and in the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the ATS (and the TVPA) in Sosa. The
court did not read the House and Senate Judiciary Committees'
statements that the ATS should "remain intact"9' after the enactment
of the TVPA as necessarily indicating that Congress intended there to
be two overlapping causes of action for official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing that aliens may pursue. Rather, these statements only indi-
cated "that the enactment of the [TVPA] did not signal that torture
and killing are the only claims which can be brought under the
[ATS] .,,g2 By the Seventh Circuit's logic, interpreting the TVPA to oc-
cupy the field of the ATS renders the cause of action provided by the
TVPA truly "unambiguous,"93 as Congress intended. Meanwhile, the
ATS, though precluded in this respect, would "not be replaced" but
instead would "remain intact" to carry out its "other important uses,,94
such as providing a jurisdictional basis for TVPA claims and support-
ing implied common law causes of action for certain other ATS claims
not covered by the TVPA.
The Seventh Circuit also indicated that its interpretation of the
ATS/TVPA relationship as preclusive abided by the spirit of judicial
restraint espoused by the Supreme Court in Sosa.91 The Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the Sosa Court strongly urged caution in recognizing
private causes of action based on violations of international law be-
90 Id. On remand, the district court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims under the
TVPA's exhaustion requirement and found that the requirement did not prevent the
claims from going forward, as the plaintiffs "satisfied their burden of proving that Ni-
geria did not and does not provide them an adequate forum for their lawsuit." Abiola
v. Abubakar, 435 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838 (N.D. Il1. 2006).
92 See supra note 52 (discussing this portion of the TVPA's legislative history).
92 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 885 n.2.
9s S. REP. NO. 102-249, at4 (1991).
94 Id. at 4-5.
95 See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 885 ("While there is no explicit statement to this effect
in Sosa, the implications are that the cause of action Congress provided in the [TVPA]
is the one which plaintiffs alleging torture or extrajudicial killing must plead.").
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cause the Court was wary of encroaching upon the legislative and ex-
ecutive spheres. This led the Seventh Circuit to conclude, "It is hard
to imagine that the Sosa Court would approve of common law claims
based on torture and extrajudicial killing when Congress has specifi-
cally provided a cause of action for those violations and has set out
how those claims must proceed." 96 Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, interpreting the TVPA to occupy the field of the ATS with re-
spect to claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing not only
complies with the intent of the statute as expressed in its legislative
history, but it also allows courts to heed the Supreme Court's caution-
ary tone in Sosa most fully.
In addition to its apparent compliance with both the will of Con-
gress and the disposition of the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation is also appealing because of the facially sensible conse-
quences that it yields. First, this interpretation eliminates a potential
overlap in coverage between the two statutes, thereby cleaning up the
statutory structure and dispelling some of the ambiguity regarding the
statutes' relationship to one another. Under the "occupying the field"
reading, if a claim falls within the scope of the TVPA, then it must be
brought under the TVPA and must comply with all of the TVPA's re-
quirements and definitions. Such an interpretation simplifies the
stance of the prevailing precedent in other circuits, which allows
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing to be brought under
both statutes but applies certain aspects of the TVPA to ATS claims in
an unclear and perhaps even inconsistent fashion.97
The Seventh Circuit's approach also ensures that aliens and U.S.
citizens are held to the same standards and requirements when bring-
ing claims for official torture and extrajudicial killing. This symmetry
corresponds to the plain language and apparent intention of the
TVPA, which addresses aliens and U.S. citizens together without any
suggested differentiation in treatment. The outcome under the pre-
vailing precedent lacks this logical symmetry: it seems to make U.S.
federal courts more accessible to aliens than to U.S. citizens with re-
spect to such claims by affording aliens two distinct causes of action
(as opposed to one) and by allowing them to circumvent the TVPA's
96 Id. at 885-86.
97 See supra Part I.F (discussing how courts generally have interpreted the TVPA's
statute of limitations, definitions, and exhaustion of remedies requirements to interact
with claims brought under the ATS).
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terms and requirements, such as exhaustion, via the ATS.9 Further-
more, one could argue that, by demanding that all claims potentially
covered by the TVPA be brought under the TVPA and thus be subject
to the TVPA's terms and requirements, U.S. federal courts can ensure
that their treatment of such claims aligns with norms of international
law as codified domestically in the TVPA. This result would respect
the specific legislative intent of Congress while also achieving greater
conformity with the general practices of the international community
to whom this cause of action may apply.9
Lastly, as the Seventh Circuit noted, the recognition of independ-
ent causes of action under the ATS and the TVPA for claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing creates a potential overlap in coverage
between the statutes; this overlap, in turn, may provide alien plaintiffs
with an end run around the TVPA and its terms and requirements,
and thus creates the risk that the TVPA may be rendered effectively
"meaningless" in the statutory scheme. 00 The Seventh Circuit's inter-
98 See Christopher W. Haffke, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Sym-
bol than Substance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1484 (1994) ("Unless the TVPA is interpreted to
implicitly restrict the [ATS] to circumstances where all available remedies within the
violating nation have been exhausted, the TVPA's exhaustion of remedies requirement
can be circumvented.").
99 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting the argu-
ment presented by the European Commission as amicus curiae that "basic principles of
international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant
must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps
in other forums such as international claims tribunals"); Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 890 nn.6-
7 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (compiling international and domestic sources to demon-
strate that "[e]xhaustion of remedies requirements are a well-established feature of
international human rights law," and pointing out that "[iut is also well-established
that, as a general proposition, U.S. law should incorporate and comport with interna-
tional law where appropriate" and that "[t]he TVPA's legislative history reveals that its
exhaustion provisions are expressly modeled on those of customary international
law"); Rosica Popova, Sarei v. Rio Tinto and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule in the
Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act: Short-Term Justice, but at What Cost?, 28 HAMLINEJ.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 517, 533, 529-30 (2007) (concluding that "the exhaustion [of local
remedies] rule has been accepted and well-recognized as a customary rule of interna-
tional law" anJ that, given "the exhaustion rule's unchallenged acceptance in interna-
tional law[,] ... it would be a mistake to regard [it] as optional, dispensable, or sever-
able from the norms of customary international law").
100 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 885 (majority opinion) ("No one would plead a cause of
action under the [TVPA] and subject himself to its requirements if he could simply
plead under international law."); see also Haffke, supra note 98, at 1483 (concluding
that "[i]t was undoubtedly Congress' intent that torture and extrajudicial killing claims
be brought under the TVPA, thereby implicitly repealing the [ATS]," because "[i]f the
TVPA is not construed as an implied repealer of the [ATS], [the statute of limitations
and exhaustion of remedies] provisions [of the TVPA] will be rendered inutile").
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pretation eliminates this concern and guarantees that claims of offi-
cial torture and extrajudicial killing are handled in accordance with
Congress's most recent and specific expression of legislative will.
Surely this outcome is more appropriate, the argument goes, than al-
lowing the TVPA to be reduced to a formality by the vague language
and unstated authority of an ancient statute.
III. A CASE AGAINST OCCUPATION: ARGUMENTS FOR A
SUPPLEMENTAL INTERPRETATION
Though the Seventh Circuit's decision in Enahoro to adopt a pre-
clusive reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship is not unreasonable or
without its appeal, it nonetheless produces an inappropriate result for
courts to follow. Instead, a supplemental understanding of the two
statutes, in which both provide alien plaintiffs with distinct yet poten-
tially overlapping federal causes of action for claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing, corresponds most closely with the discernible
indications of legislative intent underlying each statute and with the
disposition adopted toward the statutes by the Supreme Court in Sosa.
As demonstrated below, an examination of the structure, plain lan-
guage, and legislative history of the statutes reveals no clear manifesta-
tion of congressional intent to have the TVPA limit or preclude the
scope of the ATS. Given this lack of clear and manifest intent, gener-
ally accepted principles of statutory interpretation suggest that courts
should not make the legislative decision to read the TVPA to limit or
preclude the ATS, but should instead interpret both statutes to their
fullest acceptable extent. Such judicial restraint in construing this
particular field of law is encouraged further by the clear, general
mandate to that effect that the Supreme Court put forth in Sosa. Fur-
thermore, the particular attitude that the Court appears to adopt to-
ward the TVPA in its analysis of the ATS in Sosa also argues against a
preclusive interpretation of the relationship. Lastly, the practical con-
sequences of adopting a supplemental interpretation by no means un-
dermine the interpretation's legitimacy, as those advocating for a pre-
clusive reading may argue. To the contrary, a supplemental
interpretation encourages courts to read the ATS and the TVPA in a
manner that tracks each statute's distinct language, structure, and pur-
pose most closely, and allows both statutes to retain a significance in the
statutory scheme that reflects these distinctions accurately.
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A. Statutory Language, Structure, and Intent
The appropriate relationship between the ATS and the TVPA is
difficult to ascertain because neither the plain meaning nor the legis-
lative history of the statutes presents a clear, definitive statement of
congressional intent in that regard. That said, when the statutes'
structure, language, and discernible legislative intent are examined in
light of established principles of statutory interpretation, they indicate
that the Seventh Circuit takes an unnecessary and undue amount of
legislative liberty in construing the ATS/TVPA relationship preclusively.
Understanding this relationship as one of mutual reinforcement, on
the other hand, grants fuller recognition and respect to the intimations
of congressional intent presented by the statutes, as well as to the gen-
eral interpretive principles used by courts to assess this intent.
This conclusion is suggested first by the language and structural re-
lationship of the statutes. On its face, the TVPA does not directly repeal
or amend the ATS. Instead, the TVPA is codified as a note to the ATS
and leaves untouched the actual text of the preexisting ATS provi-
sion.'l° This structure does seem to imply that the TVPA and the ATS
are intended to interact closely and directly with one another; the
choice to cast the TVPA in terms of an appended note to the ATS, how-
ever, further implies that this interaction was not intended to function
as a direct repeal of or amendment to the ATS, but rather as a rein-
forcement of or supplement to it.' °2 Furthermore, there is no language
in the TVPA itself that plainly speaks to the ATS or its ability to support
a cause of action for claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing,
nor has Congress inserted any such language into the ATS itself. At the
time of the TVPA's enactment, a discernible precedent had emerged
that recognized the ability of the ATS to support a cause of action for
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing,' °3 and this precedent
has persisted in the years since. 1 4 Presumably, if the TVPA's enactment
was motivated by a desire to limit this aspect of the ATS, this motivation
would have been codified either by initially incorporating the TVPA
101 See supra Part I.C (discussing the enactment of the TVPA).
102 See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 887 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (interpreting the fact that
"the TVPA itself was codified as part of the Historical and Statutory Notes of the
[ATS]" as "suggest[ing] that the TVPA was meant to augment or elaborate the [ATS],
not replace it").
103 See supra Part I.B (discussing the general precedent that courts followed in in-
terpreting the ATS prior to the enactment of the TVPA).
104 See supra Part I.D, L.F (discussing the general precedent that courts have fol-
lowed in interpreting the ATS since the enactment of the TVPA).
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into the language and statutory structure of the ATS more directly, or
by subsequently amending the statutes in order to clarify the precedent
that has emerged from this ambiguity. At the very least, the language of
the two statutes and the structural relationship that Congress has cho-
sen to create between them fails to manifest a clear legislative intent
that the TVPA should occupy the field of the ATS.
The legislative history of the ATS and the TVPA (or rather, ofjust
the TVPA, given the lack of such history for the ATS 1 5) also fails to
manifest any clear congressional intent to create a preclusive
ATS/TVPA relationship. The legislative history of the TVPA states
that the statute was enacted to create "an unambiguous basis for a
cause of action that has been successfully maintained under [the
ATS]., 1 0 6 The legislative history does not state, however, that this un-
ambiguous basis should also be the exclusive basis for such a cause of
action. In creating the TVPA's unambiguous basis, the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees acknowledged the Filartiga precedent of
recognizing an implicit common law cause of action under the ATS
for certain violations of the law of nations, such as official torture and
extrajudicial killing, and expressed no apparent intention to disrupt
that precedent. 1°' Rather, the TVPA was intended to function as a
mechanism for clarifying the ATS's ability in this regard, as called for
by the divergent opinions in Tel-Oren.10 ' When addressing the interac-
tion between the ATS and the TVPA more directly, these Committees
declined to draw any specific conclusions, but did adopt a general
tone of collaboration and mutual reinforcement to characterize the
relationship-stating, for instance, that the TVPA would "enhance the
:o5 See supra Part I.A (discussing the uncertain origins of the ATS).
06 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991), re-
printed in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 ("The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and
modern basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under [the
ATS] .... ").
107 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.AN. at 86; see also William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Reme-
dies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638 (2006) ("[E]vidence of
Congress's approval of a judicially-created tort remedy is found in the [TVPA].... In
enacting the TVPA, Congress approved, codified, and elaborated upon th[e] new tort
remedy [set forth in Fildrtiga]. Rather than rejecting Fildrtiga, the Congress in effect
endorsed Fildrtiga's common law remedy by codifying it." (footnote omitted)).
108 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86; see also Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-
First Century, 35 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 39 n.117 (2006) (noting that the "primary
impetus [for enacting the TVPA] ... was to dispel any doubt about the existence of a
cause of action under the [ATS] for torture and summary execution"). For a discus-
sion of Tel-Oren, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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remedy already available under section 1350" and that the ATS
"should remain intact."'0 9 As one commentator has noted, "[T]he
clearly expressed legislative intent was that the TVPA not act to limit
potential claims under the [ATS].""° Of course, reports such as these
do not amount to binding authority in statutory interpretation, and
the Committees' particular statements here contain enough ambiguity
that they could be read not to rule out definitively the Seventh Circuit's
"occupying the field" interpretation. At the very least, however, the leg-
islative history of the TVPA, like the language of the two statutes and
the structural relationship between them, fails to manifest any clear
congressional intent to restrict the ATS by enacting the TVPA.
This absence of clear congressional intent, when viewed in light of
generally accepted principles of statutory interpretation, argues against
a preclusive reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship. Most relevantly,
the Supreme Court has ruled that "when two statutes are capable of co-
existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed con-
gressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.".. Or,
as the Court stated more fully in Posadas v. National City Bank,
The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where
there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both
if possible.... [T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear
and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and
will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the same, from the time
of the first enactment."
2
y S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86.
10 Pamela J. Stephens, Beyond Torture: Enforcing International Human Rights in Fed-
eral Courts, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 941, 953-54 (2001) (emphasis added); see alsoJeffrey E.
Baldwin, Note, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conven-
iens, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 749, 754 (2007) ("[B]oth the Senate and House commit-
tees stressed when enacting the TVPA that the [ATS] remains a viable means of ad-
dressing human rights violations and that alien plaintiffs can still opt to bring torture
claims under the [ATS] instead of the TVPA.").
nI Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
112 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); see also Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 887 (7th
Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting Posadas in concluding that "[i]t is a long-
standing canon of statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored"),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized and
reinforced this principle of statutory interpretation since its statement in Posadas. See,
e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) ("An implied repeal will only be found
where provisions in two statutes are in 'irreconcilable conflict,' or where the latter Act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and 'is clearly intended as a substitute."'
(quoting Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503)); Cook County, I1l. v. United States ex rel. Chandler,
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As many circuits have determined since Kadic,1 1 3 and as is demon-
strated more fully below, the ATS and the TVPA are fully capable of
coexisting with one another without adopting the preclusive reading
of the Seventh Circuit. A supplemental reading of the statutes does
not render them inherently incompatible; it simply creates the possi-
bility that alien plaintiffs may have two distinct and potentially
(though not necessarily) overlapping causes of action for certain
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing.
Furthermore, the distinctions between the statutes in focus and
scope indicate that the TVPA was not meant to function as "a substi-
tute for""4 the ATS with respect to claims of official torture and extra-
judicial killing, reinforcing the conclusion that the TVPA should be
interpreted as supplemental to, rather than preclusive of, the ATS.
First, by their plain language, the TVPA grants a cause of action to
aliens and U.S. citizens alike, whereas the ATS speaks only to aliens.
538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003) (concluding, after referencing Posadas, that "[i]nferring re-
peal from legislative silence is hazardous at best"); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S.
522, 524 (1987) ("It is well settled.., that repeals by implication are not favored, and
will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest." (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193, 191 (1968) (finding "no reason to ignore the
principle that repeals by implication are not favored" where "[t] here is no indication
from statutory language or legislative history" that such a repeal was intended by Con-
gress); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("When there are two
acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.").
Arguing that the Seventh Circuit's preclusive reading does not call for implicit re-
peal of the ATS, per se, but only of the common law causes of action for official torture
and extrajudicial killing that it supports, does not disrupt the outcome of this analysis.
As the Court held in Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co. of Virginia, "It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that
'[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of
a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose."' 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983) (quoting
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812), and citing
other cases for this general proposition). See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v.Johnson, 343 U.S.
779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law.., are to be read with a pre-
sumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except
when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."); see also United States v. Texas,
507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting the "longstanding... principle" expressed in Is-
brandtsen, noting that its "presumption favoring retention of existing law" applies in the
context of federal common law, and finding that while "Congress need not affirma-
tively proscribe the common-law doctrine at issue" in order for it to be repealed,
"courts may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
[common law] principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident" (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991))).
113 See supra Part I.D, I.F (identifying this line of precedent).
4a Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503.
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Second, the TVPA provides a clear, domestically codified cause of ac-
tion for a narrow set of expressly defined violations, while the right to
sue available under the ATS is less defined and is heavily reliant upon
determinations of international norms. Granted, the TVPA, as indi-
cated by its legislative history, is derived from and informed by inter-
national norms to some extent as well. The TVPA, however, ex-
tracts these norms from their international context, transplants them
into an environment controlled only by domestic forces, and codifies
them in a very particular manner. The existence of the specific cause
of action granted by the TVPA, as defined by its terms, is clear and in-
disputable so long as the statute remains in effect, whereas the ATS
cause of action can only exist if it is deemed by a court to constitute a
violation of the law of nations, a much more mutable and organic con-
cept. 1 6 In this sense, then, the TVPA creates "a clear, safe-harbor
cause of action" for aliens with claims of official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing, the presence of which need not suggest a preclusive rela-
tionship with the ATS and its more ambiguous cause of action."' To
the contrary, by providing such a safe harbor and at the same time
creating a parallel cause of action for U.S. citizens, the TVPA seems to
operate as an expansion of the remedies previously available under.I 118
the ATS, not as a limitation of or replacement for them.
As a final statutory distinction in support of this conclusion, the
TVPA-by opening its remedy to aliens and U.S. citizens alike while at
the same time restricting its remedy to only certain violations-
appears to be oriented, in its intent and focus, primarily toward the
violator. As expressed in its legislative history, the TVPA was enacted
to ensure "that torturers and death squads will no longer have a safe
115 See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6, 10 (1991) (noting that the TVPA's definitions of
"torture" and "extrajudicial killing" are derived from international sources and that the
interpretation of the TVPA's exhaustion requirement, "like the other provisions of this
Act, should be informed by general principles of international law"); see also infra notes
151-153 and accompanying text.
116 See Trnavci, supra note 17, at 265 ("The law of nations under the [ATS] has
proven to be an ever-changing category.").
117 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1094 n.26 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
TVPA confirmed the existence of a clear, safe-harbor cause of action for alien victims
of torture and extrajudicial killings.... We do not read torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing out of the [ATS] .... [A] clear safe harbor statute need not eclipse the more gen-
eral and ambiguous statute that preceded it."), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh ',
487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'gen banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
118 See id. (noting that, in these two ways, "the TVPA has expanded rather than
narrowed U.S. remedies for torture and extrajudicial killing overseas," making it inap-
propriate to adopt a preclusive reading of the statutes).
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haven in the United States, 11 9 regardless of the citizenship of the vic-
tim. While the original intent of the ATS is unclear, 120 the statute-by
creating an open-ended class of potential violations, but specifically
limiting the availability of the remedy to aliens-appears to be ori-
ented more toward providing a remedy to a certain type of victim
rather than deterring a specific type of violator. Scholarly theories
that depict the ATS as an effort to secure the status of the United
States as an emerging nation in the international context especially
reinforce this understanding of the statute. 2 ' This apparent distinc-
tion in focus and intent, when taken with the other distinctions men-
tioned above, makes it difficult to argue that Congress clearly in-
tended the TVPA to act as a substitute for the ATS with respect to
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing; rather, it suggests
that a supplemental reading of the statutes, in which each may sup-
port its own independent cause of action for such claims, more aptly
reflects the distinctive nature of each statute.
In sum, there is much ambiguity surrounding how Congress in-
tended the ATS and the TVPA to interact. The few things that are
clear in this regard seem to intimate a relationship of mutual rein-
forcement and collaboration rather than one of preclusion. Admit-
tedly, such intimations are not conclusive, and they leave room for
other rational interpretations (as presented by the Seventh Circuit, for
instance). Even if these intimations are construed neutrally, however,
the acknowledgment of the ambiguity itself points toward a supple-
mental interpretation. The lack of a clear and manifest congressional
intent regarding the proper interaction between the ATS and the
TVPA, coupled with the inherent distinctions between the two statutes
and their capacity to be read as supplemental to one another, indi-
cates that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the ATS and the
TVPA are best understood as each providing its own distinct, inde-
pendent cause of action for claims of official torture and extrajudicial
killing.
119 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85 (stating that the TVPA would serve as a "measure[] to ensure
that torturers are held legally accountable for their acts").
120 See supra Part L.A (discussing the difficulties in identifying the original intent of
the ATS).
121 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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B. The Spirit of Sosa: The Supreme Court's Take on the ATS,
the TVPA, and Judicial Restraint
The Supreme Court, like Congress, has failed to provide any defini-
tive guidance on the proper interaction between the ATS and the
TVPA. In Sosa, the Court was concerned only with claims brought un-
der the ATS that were not within the scope of the TVPA, and thus the
Court was not called upon to confront the relationship between the two
statutes directly. The Court did, however, make a few passing mentions
of the TVPA in the context of its discussion of the ATS, which provide
some limited insight into how courts should interpret the ATS/TVPA
relationship. The Court also, on a broader scale, adopted a cautionary
tone regarding the degree of legislative liberty courts generally should
take when construing the ATS. This cautionary tone, and the limited
treatment that the Court gives to the TVPA, are both open to interpre-
tation. The implications of this tone and treatment, however, especially
when informed by the analysis of statutory construction and legislative
intent above, weigh in favor of a supplemental rather than preclusive
understanding of the statutes' relationship.
1. The Sosa Court's Treatment of the TVPA
The Supreme Court in Sosa, much like the House and Senate Ju-
diciary Committees in their reports on the TVPA, generally affirmed
the reading of the ATS that had developed through Filartiga and its125
progeny. While the Court perhaps limited that reading by restrict-
ing the scope of the causes of action provided by the ATS, the Court
did not clearly express any particular desire to overturn or signifi-
cantly disrupt the precedent underlying it. Reading the TVPA to oc-
cupy the field of the ATS, however, would create a significant disrup-
tion of that precedent. 124 While the Court did not explicitly state that
this would be an inappropriate result, such a result does not seem to
fit with the Court's general acceptance and affirmance of the prevail-
ing Filartiga precedent.
1 For a more detailed discussion of this case, see supra Part I.E.
123 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004); see also supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
124 See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 889 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy,J., dissent-
ing) (observing that interpreting the TVPA to occupy the field of the ATS "would im-
plicitly undercut more than twenty years of jurisprudence, inaugurated by Filartiga"),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
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The Court's few direct mentions of the TVPA in Sosa strengthen the
view that the ATS/TVPA relationship should be construed as supple-
mental rather than preclusive. Though the Court did not speak to this
relationship directly, it did recognize the TVPA as a legislative affir-
mance of the Filartiga line of precedent and as a "clear mandate" from
Congress regarding the ability of the ATS to support certain common
law causes of action for sufficiently established and defined violations of
the modem-day law of nations.1 15 Much like the language found in the
legislative history of the TVPA, 126 this treatment of the statute by the
Court suggests a supplemental and reinforcing relationship with the
ATS, not a preclusive or occupying one. That is, while the decision in
Sosa imposes limitations on the potential reach of the ATS, nothing in
the decision indicates that the TVPA should be thought of as one such
limitation. To the contrary, the Court interpreted the TVPA as follows:
Congress ... has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of
the proper exercise of the judicial power [in construing causes of action
actionable under the ATS, as expressed through the Filartiga line of
precedent], but has responded to its most notable instance by enacting
legislation[, the TVPA,] supplementing the judicial determination in some
detail. 
127
Such treatment of the TVPA in the context of the ATS led Judge
Cudahy, in his Enahoro dissent, to conclude, "[Sosa] in fact relies on
the TVPA as evidence of Congressional acceptance of torture as a
norm enforceable via the [ATS]. There is nothing, express or implied,
in Sosa to suggest anything about preclusion."
1 28
125 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728, 731; see also supra notes 63, 78, and accompanying text
(compiling articles and cases that adopt this understanding of the Sosa Court's take on
the TVPA relative to the ATS); Beth Henderson, Comment, From Justice to Torture: The
Dramatic Evolution of U.S.-Sponsored Renditions, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 189, 211
(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court in Sosa viewed the enactment of the TVPA as
evidence of congressional recognition that "the prohibition of state-sponsored torture
had developed into a universal and obligatory norm" and as a sign of "congressional
approval" of Filartiga's holding that "official acts of torture and extrajudicial killing
(are] actionable under the ATS").
26 See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
27 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (emphasis added).
128 Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 889 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); see also id. ("The majority, in
claiming Sosa as authority for the preclusive effect of the TVPA, stands Sosa on its
head.").
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2. The Sosa Court's Call forJudicial Caution
The Court's limited treatment of the TVPA dovetails with its gen-
eral disposition in discussing the proper role of the courts in constru-
ing the ATS, which provides further support for a supplemental read-
ing of the statutes. The Court, while recognizing the discretionary
role that the lower courts will inevitably play in determining what
causes of action are to be recognized under the ATS, strongly urged
judicial restraint in the exercise of this discretion. The Court noted
that "although we have even assumed competence to make judicial
rules of decision of particular importance to foreign relations .... the
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exer-
cising innovative authority over substantive law, " 129 and the Court ad-
vocated adherence to that general practice in construing the ATS.13 °
In addition, the Court welcomed congressional clarification regarding
the ATS, which would mitigate the need for the courts to legislate
themselves. 131
This call for judicial restraint and legislative guidance can be in-
terpreted in the context of the ATS/TVPA relationship in various
ways. One can read it, in line with the majority in Enahoro, as suggest-
ing that the ATS and the common law causes of action that it may
support should be limited whenever possible. Therefore, since the
TVPA provides a statutory cause of action for claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing, there is no reason for the judicially con-
strued common law to provide the same under the ATS.13 This un-
derstanding ofjudicial restraint, however, is not required by Sosa. The
Court's apparent affirmance of the Filartiga precedent and the TVPA's
place within it suggests that the recognition of ATS claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing would fall within the restrained con-
ception of the ATS outlined by the Sosa Court. The TVPA provides
legislative endorsement for those causes of action, and so recognizing
them under the ATS would not seem to violate the Court's mandate
forjudicial restraint.
Furthermore, this mandate not only permits a supplemental read-
ing of the statutes, but also supports it. As mentioned above, the Sosa
129 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
150 Id. at 729 (noting that, when construing the ATS and the causes of action that
it supports, courts should understand that "the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping").
131 Id. at 731.
132 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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Court, in its treatment of both the ATS and the TVPA, endorsed the
Filartiga line of precedent. 33 Part of that precedent at the time of the
Sosa decision was a. distinct trend in the lower courts toward recogniz-
ing independent causes of action for official torture and extrajudicial
killing under the ATS and the TVPA. 14 The Court, in its discussion of
either statute, did not indicate any desire to disrupt that trend or dras-
tically alter the broader line of precedent of which it was a part. '3 5 By
endorsing Filartiga and inviting legislative intervention, the Court
seemed to express, if anything, a desire to stabilize the existing ATS
precedent, limit its growth to reasonable boundaries, and allow Con-
gress to respond as it sees fit, rather than having courts unduly (and
perhaps inconsistently) legislate their way through the many statutory
ambiguities of the ATS. 136 At the time of the Sosa decision, the ability
of a plaintiff to bring a claim of official torture or extrajudicial killing
under the ATS itself was not ambiguous; rather, it was a well-
established and, through the TVPA, congressionally affirmed part of
the Filartiga precedent.1 3 7  Continuing to understand the ATS and
TVPA in this supplemental manner, as precedent has indicated and as
Congress has endorsed, and declining to implicitly repeal the ATS in
this respect without clear and manifest legislative guidance, seems to
fit more closely with the Sosa Court's call for judicial caution than
does the Seventh Circuit's preclusive interpretation of the statutes.
133 See supra notes 63, 72.
M See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
135 See Beth Stephens, Comment, "The Door Is Still Ajar"for Human Rights Litigation
in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 533, 534-35 (2005) ("[T]he careful tone and the ac-
tual wording of the standard [in Sosa] mirror the narrow holding of the Fildrtiga deci-
sion and most of the cases that followed, indicating that most of the lower court prece-
dents remain valid."); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d
457, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("In light of Sosa's ambiguities, it would be inappropriate for
a district court to assume that Filartiga's view of the scope of ATSjurisdiction no longer
controls.").
136 The Ninth Circuit, in declining to read an implicit exhaustion requirement
into the ATS, interpreted the Supreme Court's tone of judicial restraint in Sosa in the
same fashion as is suggested here. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1099
(9th Cir. 2006) ("Absent any clear congressional guidance on importing a blanket ex-
haustion requirement into the [ATS], Sosa counsels against doing so by judicial
fiat .. "), withdrawn and superseded in part on reh', 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g
en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
137 This congressional affirmance, in turn, alleviates the need for courts to "infer
intent" when recognizing a cause of action for claims of official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing under the ATS, and indicates that such recognition is fully compatible with
the Sosa Court's cautious stance that "a decision to create a private right of action is
one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases." Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
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Judicial restraint, understood in this light, indicates that the ATS
and the TVPA should continue to be understood as each supporting a
cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing. Sosa should
not be read to disrupt this understanding. Such an interpretation
complies with the prevailing precedent at the time of Sosa, fits with the
Court's endorsement of the Filartiga precedent and its view of the
TVPA's role within that precedent, and does not require the courts to
make any unnecessary legislative determinations about the statutes
without the express will of Congress to support them. According to this
understanding of Sosa, if true judicial restraint is exercised, the conclu-
sion that the TVPA should occupy the field of the ATS is better left for
Congress to make expressly, not for the courts to determine implicitly.
C. Consequences of a Supplemental Reading
As demonstrated above, analysis of both congressional intent and
the disposition of the Supreme Court in Sosa indicates that the ATS and
the TVPA should be read supplementally, not preclusively, and thus
courts should continue to recognize under both statutes a cause of ac-
tion for claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing brought by
aliens in U.S. federal courts. Those arguing for the Seventh Circuit's
approach, however, would stress that these sources of authority do not
draw this conclusion definitively. Accordingly, the decision of which in-
terpretation to adopt-and, more particularly, of whether to recognize
a common law cause of action for claims of official torture and extraju-
dicial killing under the ATS-is left to the discretion of the courts, and
that discretion should be guided by an assessment of the practical con-
sequences that result from the application of each interpretation.
1
8
The immediate outcome of reading the ATS and the TVPA sup-
plementally is that aliens have two distinct, potentially overlapping
causes of action for claims of official torture or extrajudicial killing,
each subject to its own independent analysis by the courts. Thus,
aliens might choose to sue under the ATS instead of the TVPA for
claims covered by the TVPA's cause of action, despite the newer stat-
ute's direct treatment of the subject matter. As discussed in Part II.B,
supra, those in favor of the Seventh Circuit's preclusive interpretation
would find the resulting practical consequences of this outcome un-
138 Cf id. at 732-33 ("[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite
to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element
of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to liti-
gants in the federal courts." (footnote omitted)).
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satisfactory and illogical. Their chief concern would be the potential
end run around the TVPA and its requirements that a supplemental
reading would make available to aliens. This, in turn, would give rise
to a host of subsidiary concerns. For instance, (1) it affords aliens an
undue amount of access to U.S. federal courts when raising claims of
official torture and extrajudicial killing, and creates an imbalance of
treatment between aliens and U.S. citizens that contradicts the con-
gressional intent expressed in the TVPA; (2) it allows claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing to go forward without necessarily
complying with the TVPA's terms and requirements, such as exhaus-
tion of remedies, thus treating them in a manner that may be incon-
sistent with the international norms codified by Congress in the
TVPA; and (3) most importantly, it renders the TVPA effectively
meaningless in the overall statutory scheme.
Though these concerns, much like the rest of the reasoning that
underlies the "occupying the field" approach, are not unreasonable,
they overstate and mischaracterize the practical consequences of read-
ing the ATS and the TVPA supplementally. Instead, the practical con-
sequences of such an interpretation, when it is properly applied, are
fully consistent with the language, structure, and discernible intent of
each statute and accurately reflect the distinctions that exist between
them. That is, these consequences are not, in fact, illogical or con-
cerning, but rather represent the proper outcomes of the statutes;
courts should not attempt to avoid them by legislating a preclusive re-
lationship into the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme.
1. Access to Courts and Imbalance in Treatment
Under a supplemental reading, aliens derive two independent,
potentially overlapping causes of action for claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing from the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme; U.S.
citizens, on the other hand, derive only one. This creates an apparent
imbalance between aliens and U.S. citizens in the scope of their re-
spective rights to sue for claims of official torture and extrajudicial
killing in U.S. federal courts. Furthermore, U.S. citizens pursuing
their claims for official torture and/or extrajudicial killing will neces-
sarily have to do so according to the terms and requirements specified
in the TVPA, whereas aliens, due to their ability to bring a claim un-
der the ATS alone, may not have to meet such requirements. Thus,
for instance, while U.S. citizens will need to demonstrate exhaustion
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of local remedies before bringing their TVPA claim in U.S. federal
court, aliens may not be, and often have not been, '39 required to make
a similar showing for their ATS claims. By granting aliens two causes
of action and an end run around the TVPA's terms and requirements,
the supplemental reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship seems to af-
ford aliens a disproportionate amount of access to U.S. federal courts
for claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing. This is despite
the fact that Congress recently and clearly expressed, through the
TVPA, a desire for aliens and U.S. citizens to be treated in the same
manner with respect to such claims.
The existence of this apparent imbalance in treatment, however,
does not undermine the propriety of a supplemental understanding
of the ATS/TVPA relationship. To the contrary, it reflects the plain
language, structure, and intent of the statutes most accurately. That
aliens are contemplated under both the ATS and the TVPA whereas
U.S. citizens are only contemplated under the TVPA, and that the
TVPA contains certain terms and requirements that the ATS does not,
are both inherent and explicit qualities of the language and structure
of the statutes. This is the legislative scheme that Congress chose to
create when it enacted the TVPA as a note to the ATS-a choice it
made with full awareness of the Filartiga decision and the ability of the
ATS under that decision to support a cause of action for claims of of-
ficial torture and extrajudicial killing.' 40 Had Congress wanted to in-
sure against this outcome, it could have eliminated its source and
amended the ATS directly. Instead, Congress chose both to endorse
the Filartiga precedent and to leave the text of ATS itself untouched
and intact, and Congress has stood by that choice in the years since-
even as a prevailing precedent developed in the courts affording
aliens two causes of action under the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme.
That a supplemental understanding of the ATS/TVPA relationship
respects Congress's legislative choices by adhering as closely as possi-
ble to the plain language and structure of the statutes is not a con-
cern. Rather, it would be overly aggressive for courts to impose legis-
lative judgment where none expressly exists and force the TVPA's
various terms and requirements into the ATS in order to achieve an
1s9 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the general reluctance courts
have expressed to impose an exhaustion requirement on ATS claims).
140 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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overall balance in treatment in the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme that
is not otherwise called for. 1
41
Furthermore, a supplemental understanding of the statutes, and
the apparent imbalance it creates between aliens and U.S. citizens,
pays due recognition to the respective purposes underlying each stat-
ute: the ATS's desire to ensure aliens access to judicial remedies for
certain violations while in the United States, 42 and the TVPA's desire
to express the United States' unity with the international community
in condemning official torture and extrajudicial killing and to ensure
that the United States does not become a safe haven for perpetrators
of such acts. 4 3 These purposes are similar but nonetheless distinct,
and may call for different statutory manifestations. For instance, the
ATS, given its purpose, does not have the same interest in providing
courtroom access to U.S. citizens, or even perhaps in imposing an ex-
haustion requirement on its claims, as the TVPA does. Thus, it cannot
simply be presumed that, since the TVPA intends one thing, so too
does the ATS. To argue that an imbalance in treatment between
aliens and U.S. citizens within the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme calls
for a preclusive reading of the two statutes is to overlook and under-
mine the distinction in purpose between the statutes without, once
again, any express congressional mandate to do so.
It should also be noted that, even if this imbalance in treatment
were a theoretical concern, the actual disparity in access that it creates
should not be overestimated. First, under a supplemental reading of
the ATS and the TVPA, the extent to which a claim for official torture
or extrajudicial killing under the ATS actually differs in its terms and
requirements from a claim under the TVPA will depend on how that
141 See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997) ("[W]here Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))); see also
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Because Congress was
obviously aware of the [ATS], it could have amended the statute to include an exhaus-
tion requirement similar to the one contained in the TVPA." (citing Bates)), withdrawn
and superseded in part on reh'g, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc granted, 499
F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
142 See supra Part L.A (discussing the theories espoused regarding the original mo-
tivation behind the enactment of the ATS).
1 See infra notes 151-154 and accompanying text; supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text.
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ATS claim is construed by the courts;144 there may prove to be no dis-
cernible difference in access between them, or the ATS claim may
even prove to be more restrictive in this respect. Second, even though
it is possible that aliens may be able to sidestep certain terms and re-
quirements of the TVPA by bringing suit under the ATS, an ATS suit
is difficult to maintain successfully in its own right due to the many
procedural and substantive hurdles that ATS claimants must sur-
mount:
In practical terms, plaintiffs suing under the [ATS] face several ob-
stacles that include: (1) the requirement of a high factual threshold; (2)
overcoming a forum non conveniens motion; (3) obtaining personal juris-
diction over the defendant; (4) the requirement that defendants must
not be protected by sovereign immunity; (5) showing state action for
most human rights allegations and (6) the case must not present a non-
justiciable political question.145
Thus, while aliens may not be required to demonstrate exhaustion of
local remedies when bringing suit under the ATS rather than the
TVPA, for instance, they still face a broad spectrum of obstacles that,
as a practical matter, may render the courts no more accessible under
the ATS than under the TVPA. 1
46
144 It could be, for instance, that a supplemental reading leads to the conclusion
that an exhaustion requirement should be applied to ATS claims of official torture and
extrajudicial killing. See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
145 Trnavci, supra note 17, at 258. For a fuller enumeration and discussion of the
obstacles that plaintiffs bringing claims under the TVPA and the ATS must surmount,
see deLisle, supra note 79, at 515-42; Eric Engle, The Torture Victim's Protection Act, the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REv. 501, 504-13
(2003).
146 For instance, the application of a forum non conveniens analysis to a plaintiffs
claim under the ATS calls for an inquiry into the availability and effectiveness of poten-
tial alternate fora. See Trnavci, supra note 17, at 259 ("U.S. courts will act upon claims
based on the [ATS] only if a case cannot be pursued more effectively and fairly in an-
other country that is more closely related to it. Otherwise, they will grant the objecting
defendant's motion for dismissal for forum non conveniens."). This inquiry, though cer-
tainly distinct from the one called for by an exhaustion requirement, covers some fun-
damentally similar ground in preventing the avoidance (and undermining) of more
appropriate foreign fora. See deLisle, supra note 79, at 540-42 (characterizing forum
non conveniens and exhaustion of remedies requirements as "[a]lternative forum-
related issues" and discussing their impact on ATS and TVPA suits together); Haffke,
supra note 98, at 1484-85 (noting that forum non conveniens and exhaustion of reme-
dies are both oriented toward mitigating the same "injustice caused by adjudicating
suits in an inappropriate forum"); see also Coliver et al., supra note 63, at 218 ("ATS
cases involving foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for harms occurring in a
foreign country have the highest risk of being dismissed based on the forum non conven-
iens doctrine."); Engle, supra note 145, at 506-07 (discussing the forum non conveniens
procedural hurdle as it applies to ATS and TVPA claims).
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Third, the actual disparity created by the potential circumvention
of the TVPA's terms and requirements is further diminished when the
actual effects of some of those requirements are analyzed. Take, for
instance, the TVPA's exhaustion requirement, which was at issue in
Enahoro: though it is certainly, in form, a barrier to courtroom access,
the TVPA's legislative history indicates that, in practice, it should not
prove to be particularly difficult to overcome. As the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted, the fundamental nature of the claims covered by
the TVPA urges that courts generally should treat the "initiation of
litigation under this legislation [as] virtually prima facie evidence that
the claimant has exhausted his or her remedies in the jurisdiction in
which the torture occurred." 147 Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee indicated that, under the TVPA, "[t]he ultimate burden of
proof and persuasion on the issue of exhaustion of remedies.., lies
with the defendant": the defendant must "rais[e] the nonexhaustion
of remedies as an affirmative defense and must show that domestic
remedies exist that the claimant did not use," and the plaintiff is then
able "to rebut [this defense] by showing that the local remedies were
ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously
futile." 148 Thus, as a general matter, satisfaction of the TVPA's exhaus-
tion requirement does not present an especially substantial hurdle for
either aliens or U.S. citizens in gaining access to U.S. federal courts,
and the fact that the ATS might provide aliens with a potential end
run around it is more a formal than functional benefit. This is cer-
tainly not to assume that this requirement may never carry actual con-
sequence, or that there are not other terms or requirements of the
147 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9-10 (1991); see also id. ("Cases involving torture abroad
which have been filed under the [ATS] show that torture victims bring suits in the
United States against their alleged torturers only as a last resort.... The committee
believes that courts should approach cases brought under the proposed legislation
with this assumption."); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("[T]he 'legislative history to the [TVPA] indicates that the exhaustion re-
quirement of § 2(b) was not intended to create a prohibitively stringent condition
precedent to recovery under the statute."' (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995))).
148 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 10; see asoJean v. Dorlien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir.
2005) (recognizing that the TVPA's exhaustion requirement is "an affirmative defense,
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof," and noting that "[t] his burden
of proof is substantial"); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(recognizing and finding in favor of the plaintiff's argument of futility in satisfying the
TVPA's exhaustion requirement); Engle, supra note 145, at 505 ("In practice.... the
realities of lawless regimes indicate that the requirement of exhaustion of local reme-
dies [under the TVPA] will not be problematic for litigants. This obstacle is more
theoretical than practical." (footnote omitted)).
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TVPA whose circumvention may yield a more substantive effect on the
actual disparity of access between aliens and U.S. citizens. Rather, it is
simply an indication that, especially in light of the many substantial
hurdles that ATS claimants face, aliens do not necessarily enjoy
greater actual access to U.S. federal courts than U.S. citizens do simply
because they may not have to clear the additional hurdles of the
TVPA. A supplemental reading, then, does not grant to aliens a dis-
proportionate amount of access to U.S. federal courts, either in theory
or in practice, and whatever disparity it may create between aliens and
U.S. citizens in that regard is an appropriate reflection of the statutory
scheme chosen by Congress.
2. Compliance with the Norms of International Law
Those criticizing the supplemental reading of the ATS/TVPA re-
lationship may next argue that, even if the ability of aliens to poten-
tially circumvent the TVPA does not afford them an undue amount of
access to the courtroom, it does risk that their claims will not be han-
dled properly once in the courtroom. In particular, they may argue
that the TVPA represents a clear statement of Congress's intent that
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing be handled accord-
ing to prevailing international norms, and also that it codifies the pre-
cise manner in which those international norms should be adopted
and applied. The ATS, meanwhile, provides only a vague and malle-
able reference to the "law of nations," and does not itself indicate in
what manner and to what extent that law of nations should, or must,
be applied. A supplemental interpretation of the ATS/TVPA rela-
tionship, by giving aliens a way to sidestep the TVPA and its terms and
requirements, risks allowing claims of official torture and extrajudicial
killing to go forward in a manner potentially inconsistent with the in-
ternational norms that the statute embraces, and thus may undermine
the legitimacy and effect of Congress's determination in that regard.
For instance, many courts that have adopted a supplemental interpre-
tation have also declined to impose an exhaustion requirement on
ATS claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing,"4 9 despite the
requirement's prevalence in the international community 15 and the
TVPA's clear congressional mandate that such claims warrant it.
149 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (providing such cases).
150 See supra note 99 (compiling sources that support this characterization of the
exhaustion requirement).
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As indicated by its legislative history, the TVPA's terms and re-
quirements, as a general matter, were born from the context of inter-
national norms and codified Congress's intention that those norms be
accepted and applied in a certain manner to claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing. The statute was enacted to "carry out the in-
tent of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,"51 and it derived important as-
pects of its content, such as its definition of "torture," from the same
international instrument.52 Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee indicated that the TVPA, and more particularly the TVPA's ex-
haustion requirement, "should be informed by general principles of
international law," 153 thereby suggesting a broader congressional de-
sire to allow international norms to shape the way that U.S. federal
courts treat claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing. Thus, it
seems fair to characterize the TVPA as a representation of Congress's
intent to accept and apply international norms in the domestic con-
text with respect to such claims, at least to the extent that Congress
saw fit. 154
That Congress may intend claims of official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing to comply with certain norms of international law, how-
ever, does not argue against the adoption of a supplemental interpre-
tation of the ATS/TVPA relationship, nor does it indicate that the
adoption of a preclusive interpretation instead is necessary, appropri-
ate, or preferable. If the concern isjust that ATS claims of official tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing comply with norms of international law,
then there is no need to read the TVPA to occupy the field of the ATS
in order to address it. Rather, courts can simply construe such ATS
claims in light of the international norms themselves without interven-
tion by the TVPA. While nothing in the ATS expressly requires this
method of analysis, construing ATS claims according to the norms of
international law flows naturally from the plain language and pur-
151 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3.
152 See id. at 6 ("The definition of torture in this bill includes word-for-word the
understandings included by the Senate concerning the definition of torture in the
Torture Convention when it ratified that convention on October 27, 1990 (Under-
standings 1 (a) and (b)).").
153 Id. at 10.
154 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 125, at 200, 213 & n.183 (identifying distinc-
tions between the definition of torture presented in the CAT and the definition that
the United States adopted in ratifying the CAT and incorporated into the TVPA).
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pose of the ATS155 and tracks the approach adopted in Sosa. 156 That
the cause of action under the ATS is based on federal common law
does not interfere with this approach, as "there is little doubt that in-
ternational law is incorporated into United States domestic law as a
form of federal common law," 57 and since "[i] nternational law is part
of our law, ... [it] must be ascertained and administered by the courts
ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending on it are duly presented for their determination."''5 8 Accord-
ingly, the recognition of a cause of action under the ATS, based on
federal common law as derived from the "law of nations," does not
risk undermining an intention that such a cause of action be in-
formed by principles of international law. A proper supplemental in-
terpretation of the ATS and the TVPA, which construes claims of offi-
cial torture and extrajudicial killing according to the norms of
international law, negates any such concern without unduly legislating
a preclusive effect into the ATS/TVPA relationship.
If the concern, however, is not that claims of official torture and
extrajudicial killing under the ATS may not comply with norms of in-
ternational law themselves, but rather that such claims may not com-
ply with Congress's precise determination and appropriation of those
norms as expressed in the TVPA, then that concern would likely per-
sist under a supplemental reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship. It
could very well be a consequence of the supplemental interpretation
that a court, in analyzing an ATS claim under international law, may
find that certain norms manifest themselves differently in that inter-
national context than they do in the TVPA's domestic codification.
This potential distinction in construction, however, much like the po-
tential disparity in access discussed above, is not properly character-
ized as a "concern" to be avoided. Rather, it is an appropriate reflec-
155 See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 n.6 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dis-
senting) ("Certainly in applying a statute like the [ATS], where liability is predicated
on 'violation of the law of nations,' it would seem natural to honor the basic tenets of
public international law."), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
156 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729, 733 (2004) (noting that "[f]or
two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes
the law of nations" and determining that, under the ATS, "Alvarez's detention claim
must be gauged against the current state of international law").
157 Casto, supra note 107, at 641.
158 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 890
n.6 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (citing past Supreme Court cases, including The Paquete
Habana, in concluding that it is "well-established that, as a general proposition, U.S.
law should incorporate and comport with international law where appropriate").
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tion of the language, structure, and respective purposes of each stat-
ute, and it does not call for the adoption of a preclusive rather than
supplemental interpretation of the ATS/TVPA relationship. The
TVPA, by its plain language, does not focus on international law.
Though its legislative history indicates the statute's relationship with
this body of law, the statutory language itself only calls for actual ref-
erence to it once, in assessing a portion of the definition of "extraju-
dicial killing."159 The TVPA is not so much an incorporation of inter-
national norms as it is a domestic selection and codification of some
of those norms in a very particular manner. It is a statement of the
United States' stance toward particular acts of official torture and ex-
trajudicial killing, and while it demonstrates a desire to comply with
international law, it sets forth the terms of such compliance in a static
and unilateral manner. Meanwhile, the ATS, by its plain language,
speaks directly to the "law of nations" itself, not to any domestically
codified version thereof. It operates to provide a judicial remedy to
aliens for violations of that law of nations and the norms of the inter-
national community that form it. There is nothing in the statute to
suggest that Congress, and not the international community, should
be the arbiter of those norms, or that the United States' recognition
of such norms through the ATS should be limited by forces other
than the inherently international law of nations. The enactment of
the TVPA as simply a note to the ATS does not suggest otherwise. If
anything, it suggests that this domestic codification is meant to sup-
plement, not preclude (as a direct amendment or repeal could), the
law of nations already covered by the ATS.
Lastly, this understanding of the language and purpose of the ATS
is reinforced by the Court's construction of the statute in Sosa, which
indicates that the ATS is able to support causes of action that are not
statutorily codified, but rather that are based on federal common law
and derived from and informed by the law of nations as "gauged
against the current state of international law."'O The Court's subse-
quent application of this analysis to the facts of Sosa does not indicate
that Congress is or should be the sole authoritative source for this in-
ternational law,' 6' nor does the Court's treatment of the TVPA indi-
159 See TVPA § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) (indicating that the definition of
"extrajudicial killing" under the TVPA "does not include any such killing that, under
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation").
160 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.
161 Id. at 733-38 (analyzing primarily international, as well as some domestic,
sources to determine whether plaintiff has a common law cause of action).
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cate that this must be otherwise with respect to ATS claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing.
16
1
Thus, the existence of a potential disparity between the judicial
construction of international norms under the ATS and the congres-
sional codification of them under the TVPA is an appropriate reflec-
tion of the distinct language, structure, and function of each statute.
To seek to eliminate this potential disparity by adopting a preclusive
reading of the statutes is to unduly disregard these inherent distinc-
tions. The supplemental reading, on the other hand, uncouples the
ATS from the TVPA in its determination of the law of nations, and
thus gives the ATS the freedom to respond to and incorporate the
norms of the international community as they develop. It allows those
construing the statute to discern most accurately what the "law of na-
tions" itself currently is, as opposed to what the domestic appropria-
tion or dissection of it may be. Courts certainly could and should look
for congressional insight and guidance in making the determination
of what the current norms may be. Precluding the courts from mak-
ing the determination themselves, however, as the "occupying the
field" approach does, would unduly restrict the ATS's ability to oper-
ate responsively in the international context, as its language and pur-
pose urge. That a supplemental reading of the ATS and the TVPA
preserves this ability is not a concern, but rather a desirable practical
consequence of its implementation.
3. Meaningfulness of the TVPA Under a Supplemental Reading
For those in favor of the "occupying the field" approach, the
strongest and most fundamental objection to a supplemental reading
of the ATS/TVPA relationship still remains: a supplemental reading,
by affording aliens the choice between two distinct and potentially
overlapping causes of action for claims of official torture and extraju-
dicial killing, risks rendering the TVPA and its terms and require-
ments effectively meaningless. While gutting the TVPA of its statutory
significance and worth would raise legitimate concern, this is not an
actual or necessary consequence of a supplemental reading of the
ATS/TVPA relationship. To the contrary, the TVPA, as an express
and defined grant of a cause of action, retains a very certain and sub-
162 See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that the Court's treatment of the TVPA in Sosa
generally suggests an informing and reinforcing, not limiting or precluding, interac-
tion between that statute and the courts' exercise of judicial discretion in analyzing
common law causes of action under the ATS).
2008] 1427
1428 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREV1EW [Vol. 156:1383
stantial meaning under a supplemental reading; there is no need to
occupy the field of the ATS in order to preserve it. In addition, by in-
terpreting the statutes supplementally, the ATS retains its own distinct
meaning with respect to claims of official torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing as well, thereby allowing the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme to real-
ize its overall meaning and value as fully as possible-an effect not
achieved by a preclusive reading of the statutes.
First, regardless of how the relationship between the statutes is in-
terpreted, the TVPA retains meaning relative to the ATS simply by
providing an explicit cause of action to U.S. citizens for claims of tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing committed under actual or apparent au-
thority, or color of law, of any foreign nation. The ATS does not sup-
port an equivalent cause of action, and thus the TVPA is certainly
meaningful for those U.S. citizens who rely on it to provide them with
an explicit fight to sue. 163 Where the TVPA risks losing meaning,
however, is with respect to aliens bringing claims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing-that is, the area of potential overlap be-
tween the ATS and the TVPA. Merely because the TVPA does not
provide the exclusive basis for aliens to pursue such a cause of action,
however, does not mean that the TVPA loses its worth and statutory
effectiveness in that area. As stated in Part I.C, supra, the TVPA was
enacted to provide an "unambiguous " ' cause of action for victims of
torture and extrajudicial killing, regardless of citizenship, in order to
ensure "that torturers and death squads will no longer have a safe ha-
ven in the United States."' 65 Regardless of how the ATS is read, the
TVPA will retain independent significance as a clear and stable decla-
ration of U.S. policy in this regard, something that the ATS itself does
not offer.
In addition to retaining this symbolic value, the TVPA, because of
its lack of ambiguity relative to the ATS, will also continue to have sig-
nificant practical value under a supplemental interpretation. As men-
tioned above, the TVPA effectuates U.S. policy with respect to official
torture and extrajudicial killing, and this domestic codification of a
cause of action puts to rest any doubt (as expressed in Tel-Oren, for in-
stance) that aliens have at least some form of civil remedy for such vio-
163 See Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 888 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("The majority's conten-
tion that the TVPA would be 'meaningless' if it did not preempt the [ATS] is... incor-
rect-the TVPA still serves its purpose of filling a gap in the [ATS] 's coverage by pro-
viding a cause of action for certain human rights violations.").
164 S. REP. No. 102-249, at4 (1991).
165 Id. at 3.
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lations in U.S. federal courts. The ATS, on the other hand, does not
by its own language provide a comparable degree of specificity, cer-
tainty, or stability. To start, the ATS itself does not contain any ex-
press mandate requiring that it be able to support federal common
law causes of action. Though Sosa holds that the ATS has this ability
to a limited extent, the Court made this determination with much
caution and qualification, and over the pointed objection of three of
its members.' 66 Based on this opinion, it is difficult to derive much
lasting confidence or certainty about the ATS's ability in this regard.
Furthermore, it is difficult to reliably predict which causes of action
will be recognized under the ATS or anticipate what their exact scope
and shape may be. These causes of action arise from judicial dis-
cernment of the abstract concept of "a tort... committed in violation
of the law of nations,"167 and thus their existence and contours are de-
rived from mutable sources such as the norms of international law'68
and the discretion of the courts. The ATS, by not explicitly specifying
or defining the causes of action it supports, provides no substantive
guidance in this determination.
The ATS offers no guarantee, then, that aliens seeking to bring a
claim of official torture and extrajudicial killing will have a right to do
so. The ATS itself does not require that such a cause of action exist,
nor, necessarily, does the federal common law. While the Court in
Sosa appears to affirm the status of official torture and extrajudicial
killing as within the current substantive scope of the ATS, ] 69 this is not
a foregone conclusion based on that opinion. 7 ' And even if there
currently is such a cause of action under the ATS, there is nothing to
ensure that the international community's norms with respect to offi-
cial torture and extrajudicial killing, and thus ATS's coverage of them,
will not change. Considering the uncertainty and instability presented
166 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (declining, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, to join
the majority's "reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary to create
causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-based norms ... because the
judicial lawmaking role it invites would commit the Federal Judiciary to a task it is nei-
ther authorized nor suited to perform").
'67 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
IM See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 63, 72, 78, 125, and accompanying text.
170 See, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 764
n.207 (2006) ("The [Sosa] Court's discussion of torture was.., arguably dicta. Its
status as dicta is important because it leaves open a plausible argument that the ATS
does not, after all, provide a broad cause of action for torture claims.").
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by the ATS, the TVPA's unambiguous and detailed cause of action for
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing retains a very signifi-
cant practical value and meaning for those aliens, present or future,
who have been victims of such acts. It secures for them a right to sue,
defines the scope of that right, and specifies how they need to pursue
it. Given the choice between the ambiguous and discretionary quality
of the ATS, and the unambiguous and well-defined quality of the
TVPA, it seems as though many plaintiffs would opt to sue under the
TVPA rather than undertake the complexity and uncertainty of the
ATS. At the least, it is certainly not inevitable that plaintiffs would
flock to the ATS and allow the TVPA to descend into disuse and ob-
scurity simply because of the potential overlap between the two.
Thus, adopting a construction of the ATS that overlaps with part
of the TVPA's scope does not disgorge the TVPA of its intended statu-
tory value as an unambiguous and stable cause of action for claims of
official torture and extrajudicial killing, available to aliens and U.S.
citizens alike. Indeed, the meaningfulness of such clarity should not
be undervalued in an area of law rife with as much ambiguity and po-
tential for change as that surrounding the ATS. Furthermore, a sup-
plemental reading preserves the meaning of the TVPA in a manner
that does not unnecessarily diminish the meaning of the ATS. Under
that reading, the TVPA is able to effectuate U.S. policy with respect to
claims of official torture and extrajudicial killing, and the ATS, at the
same time, is able to track and reflect the norms of the international
community with respect to such claims, just as it does with respect to
all potential causes of action it may support. Thus, a supplemental
reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship preserves the meaning and
value of both statutes while at the same time creating a dynamic be-
tween them that appropriately captures their structural relationship as
well as the distinctions between them. A preclusive reading of the
statutes, meanwhile, diminishes the scope of the ATS unnecessarily
and without clear congressional mandate, disregards the statutory dis-
tinctions between the ATS and TVPA, and squanders the particular
value that a cause of action for claims of official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing under the ATS may bring to the statutory scheme.
The TVPA, then, would not be rendered effectively meaningless
by a supplemental reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship. To the
contrary, the TVPA would retain significant value both as a theoretical
and practical matter, and the net value of the ATS/TVPA relationship
would be realized more fully than it would under a preclusive reading
of the statutes. This outcome does not give rise to concern.
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Thus, the consequences of a supplemental interpretation of the
ATS/TVPA relationship do not argue against its legitimacy, as those
supporting a preclusive reading of the relationship may suggest. In-
stead, a supplemental reading retains the meaning and effectiveness
of the ATS/TVPA statutory scheme as fully as possible, recognizes and
respects the nature and intent of each statute, and does not require
courts to make any undue legislative assumptions-none of which a
preclusive reading accomplishes. Furthermore, as demonstrated
above, reading the statutes supplementally rather than preclusively
adheres more closely to the discernible legislative intent underlying
the statutes and to the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa.
While reading the TVPA to occupy the field of the ATS has an admit-
ted rationale and appeal, it nonetheless is an inappropriate and un-
necessary interpretation for courts to apply without a clear manifesta-
tion of legislative will to that effect. As such a manifestation is lacking,
a supplemental reading of the ATS/TVPA relationship is the prefer-
able interpretation for courts to adopt.
IV. REVISITING THE PREVAILING PRECEDENT
Though the conclusion reached by this Comment generally aligns
with the prevailing precedent that has developed in the courts since
Kadic, this does not necessarily mean that the prevailing precedent of-
fers a supplemental interpretation of the statutes that is beyond im-
provement. The prevailing precedent, for instance, has properly rec-
ognized that the ATS is capable of supporting its own claims of official
torture and extrajudicial killing. It has been less consistent, however,
in indicating if and when those ATS claims should be informed by the
more specific terms and requirements of the TVPA. In their handling
of ATS claims, courts have tended to import the TVPA's statute of
limitations, not import its exhaustion of remedies requirement, and
sometimes import its definitions of "torture" and "extrajudicial kill-
ing."  It is not surprising that, given the prevailing precedent's
piecemeal and seemingly inconsistent importation of the TVPA into
the ATS, an approach like the Seventh Circuit's would emerge as ap-
pealing: preclusion simply takes importation to its full and logical ex-
treme and, in so doing, standardizes and simplifies what is an other-
171 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (outlining these trends and com-
piling cases).
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wise muddied statutory interaction. Though the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach is ultimately improper, its exaggerated nature helps bring to
the surface both how a proper supplemental interpretation of the
ATS/TVPA relationship ought to be implemented, and how the pre-
vailing precedent, by occasionally "supplementing" the ATS with cer-
tain pieces of the TVPA, may not be following it.
A proper supplemental interpretation of the ATS/TVPA relation-
ship begins with the recognition that the causes of action offered un-
der each statute, though potentially overlapping, are fundamentally
distinct from and independent of one another. As discussed in Part
III.A, the TVPA provides a cause of action that is well defined and tai-
lored toward a particular set of violations; it is an unambiguous and
self-contained piece of domestic law. The ATS, on the other hand,
provides a cause of action to a certain class of individuals for an open-
ended set of violations; it is ambiguous, undefined, and heavily reliant
on international norms for its substantive scope. The statutes, then,
are supplemental in the sense that, if their distinct purposes and func-
tions align with respect to a given claim, they will end up overlapping
in the cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing that
they each provide. They should not, however, be considered supple-
mental in the sense that the terms and requirements of one can be
presumptively assumed to apply to and fill out the other; this under-
standing of "supplemental," though tempting in its efficiency, would
be inappropriate for the same reasons as a preclusive reading of the
statutes is, albeit more subtly so.
This general understanding of the interaction between the stat-
utes, in turn, should inform how the statutes are permitted to interact
in more particular respects. Namely, the Sosa Court's conclusion that
causes of action under the ATS must be "gauged against the current
state of international law"'172 should be applied as fully as possible to
the assessment of those causes of action. For instance, under Sosa, the
existence and scope of federal common law claims that are actionable
under the ATS are derived from international norms; such a claim will
only be recognized if it can be shown to have no "less definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.""73 It seems appropriate, by exten-
sion, that courts derive the definitions for these claims from the same
international sources of authority that made the claims "sufficiently
172 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
173 Id. at 732.
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definite to support a cause of action," 174 rather than simply importing
definitions directly from a domestic statute (such as the TVPA) with
no further analysis. Granted, Congress may have intended the defini-
tions provided in the TVPA to reflect international norms, 7 5 and thus
this distinction in methodology may not amount, in practice, to much
more than a formality at the present time given the likely overlap be-
tween the current international definitions and the TVPA ones. That
said, these definitions may also diverge in potentially significant re-
spects, either at present or in the future.116 Allowing the ATS to track
the development of international norms, rather than being bound
strictly by the language of the TVPA, would correspond to the Su-
preme Court's general construction of the ATS in Sosa 177 and the
amount of judicial discretion it authorizes, and would also properly
reinforce the distinction-be it philosophical or practical-between
the causes of action that each statute provides.
This same logic can be applied to the TVPA's exhaustion of
remedies requirement. Most courts, just as they have recognized the
ability of the ATS and the TVPA to provide distinct causes of action,
have correspondingly declined to impose the TVPA's exhaustion re-
quirement on ATS claims."" While this threshold determination is
174 Id.
175 See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6 (1991) (noting that "[t]he TVPA incorporates
into U.S. law the definition of extrajudicial killing found in customary international
law[, which] ... conforms with that found in the Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949)," and that "the
definition of torture in this bill includes word-for-word the understandings included by
the Senate concerning the definition of torture in the Torture Convention when it
ratified that convention on October 27, 1990 (Understandings 1 (a) and (b))" (foot-
notes omitted)).
176 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit, in addressing a claim of official torture
brought under the ATS, looked to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which courts often look to when
"seek[ing] to define torture in international law." Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005). Most federal courts have looked to
this convention to provide a definition of torture for ATS purposes. Chavez v. Car-
ranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899-900 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). In adopting this definition,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that it differed from the definition provided in the TVPA
and hypothesized that "[i]n some case [sic], the different definitions might actually
make a difference." Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1252; see also supra note 154 (indicating dis-
tinctions between the TVPA definition of torture and the definition put forth in the
CAT itself).
177 See supra notes 68-70, 160-162, and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. For a criticism of this prevailing ap-
proach, and an argument for the application of the TVPA's exhaustion requirement to
all ATS claims, see Casto, supra note 107, at 660-62.
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correct under a proper supplemental reading of the statutes, this is
not to say that, under such a reading, a claim under the ATS will never
have to satisfy an exhaustion requirement such as the TVPA's. The
question of whether and how an ATS claimant must demonstrate ex-
haustion of remedies will ultimately depend on the court's assessment
of whether the relevant norms of the international community call for
the cause of action in question to be qualified by such a requirement.
Even though the ATS does not expressly incorporate such a require-
ment, the "law of nations" incorporated by the ATS and controlling
the analysis may." 9 This approach, in addition to appropriately re-
flecting the nature of the ATS/TVPA relationship and the inherent
distinctions between the two statutes, also corresponds with the Su-
preme Court's particular statement in Sosa that it "would certainly
consider [an exhaustion] requirement in an appropriate case."' ' The
TVPA may be used to help inform the courts' determinations of what
an "appropriate" case may be-for instance, by pointing the courts in
the direction of the relevant international norms that will control the
analysis, or by reflecting Congress's insight on the matter. The mere
fact that the TVPA requires a certain showing of exhaustion of reme-
dies, however, should not amount to conclusive authority that the ATS
should (or should not) require the same. Thus, a supplemental read-
ing of the interaction between the ATS and the TVPA is not necessar-
ily incompatible with the application of some sort of exhaustion re-
quirement to claims brought under the ATS. Such a reading,
however, does argue against reflexively importing this exhaustion re-
quirement from the TVPA rather than allowing the international
norms already informing the overall ATS analysis to guide this particu-
lar determination as well.
179 Compare Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 n.6 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[e]xhaustion of remedies requirements are a well-
established feature of international human rights law" and compiling treatises and in-
ternational sources to support that conclusion), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1175 (2006), and
supra note 99 (compiling sources that discuss the general acceptance of exhaustion of
remedies as an international norm), with Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1094
n.27 (9th Cir. 2006) (engaging in a thorough treatment of whether the ATS should be
read to impose an exhaustion requirement and noting that, "[t]hough reading ex-
haustion into the [ATS] would be consistent with international law norms, failing to
read exhaustion into the [ATS] would not violate those norms"), withdrawn and super-
seded in part on reh'g, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923
(9th Cir. 2007), and id. at 1096 (questioning whether international exhaustion re-
quirements are properly applied in the context of "hybrid" ATS litigation).
180 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (emphasis added).
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The approach applied above to the definitions and the exhaustion
requirement of the TVPA may not likewise control the analysis of
whether the TVPA's statute of limitations should be applied to claims
brought under the ATS, as there appears to be controlling judicial au-
thority that limits the courts' discretion on the matter. The Supreme
Court has established that, when a federal statute fails to provide a
statute of limitations period for causes of action that it creates, courts
should fill that gap by "look[ing] to the state statute most closely
analogous to the federal Act in need."'8 1 Courts, however, should look
to the most closely analogous federal, not state, statute in cases when
"a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and
the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more ap-
propriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."'8 2 The determination of
whether the TVPA constitutes the "most closely analogous statute" to
the ATS for the purposes of this test is beyond the scope of this par-
ticular discussion.18 3 What is important to glean from this discussion,
however, is the more fundamental recognition that, if such definitive
authority exists to guide the courts' resolution of this ambiguity in the
ATS/TVPA relationship, it must be followed. A supplemental inter-
pretation of the ATS and TVPA, after all, is a method to guide courts
in their exercise of discretion. It does not require or suggest that
when binding authority, be it legislative or judicial, exists to settle a
matter, it should not be respected. Thus, should it be determined
that the TVPA is the statute most closely analogous to the ATS under
this standard, then courts, in turn, should heed the Supreme Court
and apply the TVPA's statute of limitations to the ATS-regardless of
whether the courts otherwise read the statutes supplementally. It
could be argued that this "most closely analogous statute" analysis
should be extended and applied to other elements of the TVPA, such
as the exhaustion requirement. This argument has its appeal and may
prove to be a fair interpretation of that analysis. That said, such an in-
terpretation does seem to call for an unnecessary extension of a lim-
181 N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
12 Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
183 Given the clear connection between the statutes and the foreign policy implica-
tions that they involve, most courts have held that the TVPA does constitute the "most
closely analogous" statute to the ATS for the purposes of construing the proper statute
of limitations for ATS claims. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (compiling
cases that demonstrate how courts have handled this issue).
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ited standard and an unwarranted departure from the scope of direct
authority set out by the Supreme Court.1s4 As such, it seems more ap-
propriate to construe those other provisions of the TVPA in accor-
dance with the overall supplemental scheme of interpretation that is
otherwise applied to the two statutes, while permitting the TVPA (if
deemed to be "most closely analogous") to inform the ATS with re-
gard to its unspecified statute of limitations.
In short, then, courts can properly implement a supplemental
reading of the ATS and the TVPA by, whenever the matter is within
their discretion, choosing not to rely authoritatively on the TVPA to
fill out the ambiguities and contours of the ATS, but rather using the
general method of analysis authorized under Sosa to do so. This is not
to say that the two statutes may not overlap or lead to the same re-
sults-they simply should achieve this uniformity through their re-
spective independent analyses, not by "supplementing" the terms of
one another. Nor is this to say that, under a proper supplemental in-
terpretation, it is impermissible for the statutes to interact with and
inform one another in certain circumstances. Given the manner in
which international norms have informed the TVPA,' 85 courts cer-
tainly may look to that statute as a reference, where appropriate, to
help guide their assessment of the international norms that control in
the ATS analysis. They should not, however, rely on the TVPA itself as
binding authority in this analysis. By exercising their discretion in this
manner, courts can afford the ATS and the TVPA the freedom to co-
exist without deviating from the realm of judicial discretion author-
ized by Sosa and without causing the statutes to bind or rewrite one
another to an extent not otherwise required by the Supreme Court or
manifestly indicated by Congress. Granted, this approach has its diffi-
culties: namely, requiring the courts to ascertain international norms
184 For instance, it seems fair to assume from the Supreme Court's statement in
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas that, "like any other civil cause of action considered by the
Supreme Court, an [ATS] suit must have a limitations period," Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1094
n.28, leaving only the question of what that limitations period should be. Id. The
Court's limited ruling in North Star Steel, however, does not likewise answer the "ques-
tion of whether exhaustion should be imported into the [ATS] in the first instance."
Id. Due to this distinction, the Ninth Circuit found no inconsistency between its deci-
sion to refuse to import the TVPA exhaustion requirement across the board into the
ATS and its prior decision to apply the TVPA's statute of limitations to ATS claims. Id.;
see also Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (outlining the rea-
soning for importing the TVPA's statute of limitations requirement into the ATS).
185 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of in-
ternational norms on Congress's determination of the TVPA's terms and require-
ments).
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creates a much more involved and labor-intensive analysis than simply
importing the requirements from the TVPA would, and asking domes-
tic courts to make determinations based on international law inher-
ently carries a general risk of confusion or misconstruction. Nonethe-
less, the ATS explicitly puts the courts in this position by extending a
federal judicial remedy to aliens based on "violation [s] ... of the law
of nations,"'' 8 6 and the TVPA, as existing supplementally with the ATS,
should not be assumed to alter this position except where explicitly
indicated.1S7 This outcome most accurately reflects the ATS/TVPA re-
lationship as it is best understood through the available authority.
Should Congress find this outcome inconsistent with its intentions,
then it can change the legislation upon which this outcome is based.
That decision, however, as indicated in Sosa, is best left to the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of the ATS and its development in the
courts, there has been, by necessity, a good deal of feeling around in
the dark. The interpretation of the proper relationship between the
ATS and the TVPA is no exception. Neither Congress nor the Su-
preme Court has spoken definitively or directly to the issue, leaving
the federal courts largely to figure it out for themselves-a familiar
position for courts that have been confronted with claims brought
under § 1350 over the past thirty years in the modern context of hu-
man rights. This Comment has attempted, as those courts have, to
feel out the proper shape of the interaction between the ATS and the
TVPA based on the little definitive light that has been cast upon it.
According to what sparse authority can be gleaned from the intima-
tions of Congress and the Supreme Court, it is most appropriate for
courts to interpret this interaction between the two statutes as funda-
mentally supplemental rather than preclusive. The Seventh Circuit's
adoption of a preclusive reading of the statutes, though reasonable
and appealing in some respects, nonetheless takes a degree of liberty
186 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
187 The Supreme Court, for its part, has demonstrated a willingness, both in Sosa
and in other decisions, to assume the risks associated with judicial utilization of inter-
national law in certain domestic contexts. See Coliver et al., supra note 63, at 183, 189
(citing cases and indicating that "over the past few years, the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly referred to international law in deciding domestic cases").
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in its interpretation that, in light of the discernible authority control-
ling the matter, is ultimately unnecessary and unwarranted.
That said, the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit toward the
interaction between the ATS and the TVPA is certainly plausible, and
indicates how much ambiguity continues to permeate this area of the
law. By adopting a supplemental interpretation of the relationship
between these statutes and applying that interpretation as consistently
as possible to all levels of their interaction with one another, courts
can clarify this one particular ambiguity in a way that is most faithful
to the statutes and their discernible purposes. Resolving this ambigu-
ity within the courts, however, does not diminish the need for further
authoritative guidance. Regardless of how courts choose to interpret
the interaction between the ATS and the TVPA-supplementally, pre-
clusively, or otherwise-there is an inherent, unsettling need for some
degree of judicial legislation on the courts' part to reach that result.
Even if Congress approves of the precedent currently prevailing in
most circuits, a clear statement of intent to that effect would free the
courts from this undue burden and allow them to proceed more com-
fortably and confidently within the realm of interpretation. More
fundamentally, such guidance would provide the general field of law
that has grown up around the ATS with a much-needed foundation of
stability and legitimacy upon which to stand. The debate raised by the
Enahoro decision, and the legitimate arguments that can be made on
both sides of it, offer just one indication of this basic need for clarity.
For, while courts and scholars may differ over their interpretations of
the ATS, the TVPA, and the proper interaction between the two, most
would likely agree on one point, at least: a little bit more light in the
room would be nice.
